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ARTICLES
ENGINEERED CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS:
INNOVATIVE OR MANIPULATIVE?
GINA-GAIL S. FLETCHER*
Credit default swaps (CDS) are, once again, making waves. Maligned for their
role in the 2008 financial crisis and condemned by the Vatican, investors are once
more utilizing CDS to achieve results of questionable market benefit. A CDS is a
financial contract that allows investors to “bet” on whether a borrower will default
on its loan. However, rather than waiting to see how their bets pan out, some CDS
counterparties are collaborating with financially distressed borrowers to guarantee
the profitability of their CDS positions—“engineering” the CDS’ outcome. Under
the CDS contract, these collaborations are not prohibited, yet they have roiled the
CDS market, leading some market participants to view the collaborations as a sign
that CDS are little more than a rigged game. Conversely, some view “engineered
CDS transactions” as an innovative form of financing for distressed companies. As
engineered CDS transactions proliferate in the market, it becomes increasingly pru-
dent to look beyond their contractual acceptability to assess whether, from a legal
point of view, these transactions are permissible.
Engineered CDS transactions demonstrate the challenges that the existing legal
and non-legal framework face in effectively responding to new forms of market
distortion. This Article examines the costs and benefits of engineered CDS transac-
tions on the market as a precursor to determining whether legal intervention is
needed. Assessment of the relative costs and benefits of engineered transactions
indicates that despite their innovativeness, engineered CDS transactions are largely
detrimental to the markets because they impose costs on actors unaffiliated with the
CDS market and, more broadly, destroy public trust in the financial markets. Yet,
despite their associated harms, legally, engineered transactions exist in a gray space.
This Article analyzes the phenomenon of engineered CDS transactions, assessing
the capacity of applicable legal frameworks, private standards, and market disci-
pline to address these transactions, and finds each to be lacking. Consequently, this
Article proposes a range of responses, including modernization of the existing anti-
manipulation framework, to mitigate the harm and collateral consequences that
stem from engineered CDS transactions.
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INTRODUCTION
“[B]etting on a ‘sure thing’ is anathema to the ideal of ‘fair and honest
markets.’”
—United States v. Chiarella, 19781
In early 2018, regulatory and media attention turned to the credit
default swap (CDS) market as an unusual financing agreement
between Hovnanian Enterprises Inc. (Hovnanian), a heavily-indebted
company, and GSO Capital Partners (GSO), a division of Blackstone
Group, was announced.2 Per the agreement, in exchange for financing
on favorable terms from GSO, Hovnanian agreed to voluntarily
default on an upcoming interest payment.3 Importantly, Hovnanian’s
voluntary default would trigger payoffs to traders who purchased CDS
protection expecting that Hovnanian would default. Among these
CDS counterparties was GSO, who stood to gain a sizable payout on
its CDS positions if Hovnanian defaulted.4 In short, Hovnanian and
GSO collaborated to guarantee the profitability of the latter’s CDS
positions in exchange for cheap financing for the former. Working
together, they “engineered” the outcome of the CDS contract and
eliminated all market uncertainty of whether Hovnanian would
default. Despite its seeming peculiarity, the GSO-Hovnanian transac-
tion is one of the latest examples of what this Article defines as “engi-
neered transactions” in the CDS market.
Once known only to sophisticated market actors, CDS gained
widespread notoriety during the 2008 financial crisis because of their
role in the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the near-collapse of
American Insurance Group.5 In simple yet incomplete terms, a CDS is
1 588 F.2d 1358, 1362 (2d Cir. 1978).
2 See, e.g., Mary Childs, The Hedge Fund Skirmish that Could Kill the CDS Market,
BARRON’S (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-hedge-fund-battle-that-
could-kill-the-cds-market-1517013136; Andrew Scurria, Blackstone Stands Down on
Hovnanian Swaps Wager, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
blackstone-stands-down-on-hovnanian-swaps-wager-1527722945.
3 See Sridhar Natarajan & Chris Dolmetsch, Hedge Fund Sues Hovnanian,
Blackstone’s GSO Over ‘Manipulation,’ BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-11/hedge-fund-solus-sues-gso-hovnanian-over-
cds-manipulation (discussing the agreement between Hovnanian and GSO).
4 See Joe Rennison, GSO Bought $330m of Protection on Hovnanian Before
Controversial Refi Deal, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/304902dc-
022a-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5 (describing that the deal between GSO and Hovnanian
“builds-in [sic] a condition that Hovnanian must default on a small portion of its existing
bonds, with the aim of triggering a windfall payout for GSO”).
5 See Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap
Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 170 (2011) (“Credit default swaps captured the
national spotlight following their role in the largest bankruptcy in the history of the United
States. On September 14, 2008, . . . Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (‘Lehman Brothers’)
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an insurance-like financial contract that transfers the risk of default of
a debt issuer, such as a corporation, municipality, or sovereign,
between counterparties.6 With fire insurance, for example, a home-
owner pays monthly premiums to her insurance company and, in
exchange, the insurance company agrees to compensate her if her
house burns down. By analogy, with a CDS, one party (the “protec-
tion buyer”) pays periodic premiums to another party (the “protection
seller”) and, in exchange, the protection seller agrees to compensate
the protection buyer in the event the third-party debtor (the “issuer”
or “company”) defaults on the debt underlying the CDS (the “under-
lying”).7 Thus, the protection seller prefers that the issuer remain sol-
vent (at least during the term of the CDS), and the protection buyer
prefers that the issuer default. With engineered transactions, CDS
traders are transforming their preferred outcomes into guarantees.
Traders are gaming their CDS contracts to guarantee that they win—
just as GSO proposed to do through its financing arrangement with
Hovnanian.
Engineered transactions are a recent phenomenon and have
resulted in renewed scrutiny of the controversial CDS markets. Some
commentators consider engineered transactions positively—they
allow distressed companies to access favorable and much-needed
funding, thereby further increasing liquidity in the credit markets.8 To
these commentators, to the extent engineered transactions harm
anyone, their impact is limited to large, sophisticated actors, and engi-
neering is merely another cost of doing business in the CDS markets.9
declared bankruptcy.”); Adam Davidson, How AIG Fell Apart, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2008,
6:49 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-how-aig-fell-apart-idUSMAR85972720080918
(detailing how AIG’s use of CDS contributed to its demise).
6 See PRACTICAL LAW FIN., RESOURCE ID NO. 0-386-8130, CREDIT DERIVATIVES:
OVERVIEW (US), Westlaw (database updated Jan. 22, 2016) (explaining that in a bilateral
single-name CDS, a party buys credit protection “against the credit risk of a third party,”
known as the reference entity, which can be a corporation or a sovereign nation, among
others).
7 See Kent Cherny & Ben R. Craig, Credit Default Swaps and Their Market Function,
FED. RES. BANK CLEVELAND (July 9, 2009), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-
events/publications/economic-commentary/economic-commentary-archives/2009-
economic-commentaries/ec-20090709-credit-default-swaps-and-their-market-function.aspx
(“In a typical transaction, the seller of the protection takes on the credit risk associated
with a reference entity in return for a quarterly premium paid by the buyer.”).
8 See Matt Levine, When Cleverness Becomes Manipulation, BLOOMBERG OPINION
(Apr. 26, 2018, 10:27 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-26/when-
cleverness-becomes-manipulation (explaining that there are people who consider these
types of transactions to be an opportunity to transform a “zero-sum derivatives bet” into
“an actual loan to an actual company that actually needed the money”).
9 See id. (criticizing the classification of engineered transactions as market
manipulation).
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On the other hand, some view engineered transactions as unfair finan-
cial arrangements that violate market expectations of how CDS
payoffs are determined, bypassing the market and its attendant uncer-
tainties.10 Indeed, some market participants have expressed doubts
that the CDS market can coexist with engineered transactions, since
these transactions undermine the utility of CDS as risk mitigation
tools.11 As the markets grapple with the effects and collateral conse-
quences of engineered CDS transactions, important questions arise as
to the advisability of allowing these transactions to continue to exist in
the markets and, importantly, their legality.12
Engineered transactions present the CDS market with an inter-
esting and perplexing conundrum—although they seem improper,
they are not impermissible under the existing terms of the CDS con-
tract, a conclusion that the International Swaps Dealers Association
(ISDA) supported.13 ISDA is a private, non-governmental trade asso-
ciation that drafts the standard-form CDS contract, including the
processes by which it is determined whether a CDS payoff has been
triggered.14 Despite expressing displeasure with the practice of engi-
neered CDS transactions, ISDA has stated that these transactions are
10 See Mary Childs, Judge Denies Injunction Request for Fancy CDS Transaction,
BARRON’S (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/congratulations-hovnanian-
gso-judge-denies-injunction-request-for-fancy-cds-transaction-1517256266 (explaining why
the losers in these kinds of transactions describe them as akin to “burning your neighbor’s
house down to collect the insurance”).
11 See Claire Boston & Sridhar Natarajan, Blackstone, Solus Settle Fight over
Hovnanian CDS Trade, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-05-30/hovnanian-pays-overdue-interest-on-bonds-within-grace-period (stating
that CDS contracts “can become almost meaningless if a [counterparty] can create or
prevent a payout on the contracts just by loaning relatively small amounts of money to a
company”).
12 See Press Release, CFTC Divs. of Clearing & Risk, Mkt. Oversight, & Swap Dealer
& Intermediary Oversight, Statement on Manufactured Credit Events (Apr. 24, 2018)
[hereinafter CFTC Press Release], https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/
divisionsstatement042418 (“Manufactured credit events may constitute market
manipulation and may severely damage the integrity of the CDS markets . . . .”); Matt
Levine, Another Weird Deal Upsets CDS Traders, BLOOMBERG OPINION (May 1, 2018,
9:59 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-05-01/another-weird-deal-upsets-
cds-traders (quoting Mike Terwilliger, a money manager at Resource America Inc., as
saying that “CDS is being manipulated to the point that it potentially invalidates the
product”).
13 This was true at the time of the transactions, but amendments have since been
proposed and adopted. See infra Section IV.C for a discussion of changes to the Master
Agreement.
14 See generally Mission Statement, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, https://
www.isda.org/mission-statement (last visited Mar. 12, 2019) (describing its mission
statement as “foster[ing] safe and efficient derivatives markets to facilitate effective risk
management for all users of derivative products”). For additional context, see infra note 67
and accompanying text.
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contractually permissible because CDS counterparties are allowed to
act in their own self-interests.15 Furthermore, although both the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC), who have regulatory authority over the
CDS market, view engineered CDS transactions as market manipula-
tion, it is debatable whether this assertion is legally supported.16
Engineered CDS transactions do not involve fraud or misrepresenta-
tion, and the parties involved typically comply with their obligations
to disclose material information once they have agreed to the terms of
the transaction.17 Thus, engineered transactions exist in a legal gap—
not prohibited under private contract law and beyond the scope of
statutory proscriptions.
This Article provides an in-depth legal analysis of engineered
CDS transactions and engages with the ongoing debate regarding
their costs and legality. This Article argues that the benefits of engi-
neered CDS transactions to distressed issuers notwithstanding, they
impose significant externalities on the market, and thus external inter-
vention is required to minimize the ex post and ex ante consequences
to third parties. However, this Article disagrees with the conclusory
assessment of the CFTC and others that engineered CDS transactions
constitute market manipulation under existing anti-manipulation laws.
Rather, these transactions, like other forms of financial innovation,
are beyond the reach of existing public laws and private rules. Further,
given the accompanying negative externalities, it is necessary to cur-
tail the occurrence of engineered CDS transactions within the market
and deter market actors from engaging in these transactions.
This Article makes three important contributions to legal scholar-
ship related to engineered transactions and the legal framework appli-
cable to CDS. First, this Article creates a typology of the three
primary strategies CDS counterparties use when engaging in engi-
neered transactions. Relying on four case studies, this Article details
the mechanisms underlying different engineering schemes, outlining
15 See Press Release, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, ISDA Board Statement on
Narrowly Tailored Credit Events (Apr. 11, 2018) (stating that amendments to the ISDA
Credit Derivatives Definition could occur because “narrowly tailored defaults . . . designed
to result in CDS payments that do not reflect the creditworthiness of the underlying
corporate borrower . . . could negatively impact the . . . overall CDS market”). But see
discussion infra Section IV.C (discussing ISDA’s proposed amendment to the CDS
contract to prohibit one form of engineered transactions).
16 See CFTC Press Release, supra note 12 (stating that manufactured credit events may
constitute market manipulation); Testimony Concerning Credit Default Swaps Before the
H. Comm. on Agric., 110th Cong. ¶ 23 (2008) (statement of Erik Sirri, Director, Division
of Trading and Markets, SEC) (“[T]here is the risk that CDS are used for manipulative
purposes.”).
17 See discussion infra Part II.
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how CDS counterparties are able to ensure the profitability of their
CDS positions.
Second, this Article undertakes a careful analysis of the ex post
and ex ante consequences of engineered transactions on three sets of
actors: (i) issuers who participate in engineered transactions; (ii) CDS
counterparties who have bought or sold protection on the issuer; and
(iii) third parties that are unconnected to the engineered transaction
and the CDS market. As a burgeoning strategy in the CDS market,
the consequences of engineered CDS transactions on the market are
under-analyzed, in part because of their newness, and in part because
commentators summarily dismiss questions of the transactions’ costs
or benefits, depending on whether they are for or against the use of
engineered CDS.18
This Article fills the gap in these conclusory discussions by bal-
ancing the ex post and ex ante effects of engineered transactions to
assess whether the transactions’ benefits outweigh their costs or vice
versa. As this analysis demonstrates, engineered transactions result in
positive externalities for issuers and, at best, maintain the status quo
of CDS as zero-sum transactions for CDS counterparties. However,
with respect to third parties, engineered transactions impose negative
externalities, including diminishing pricing efficiency, impairing
market integrity, and imposing costs on non-CDS parties that are not
internalized by the parties to an engineered transaction. Relatedly,
owing to inherent informational asymmetries and the limited ability of
CDS traders to force their counterparties to change their behavior,
market discipline is not a feasible avenue through which to address
engineered CDS transactions.19 The impotence of market discipline in
limiting the costs associated with engineered CDS transactions further
reiterates the need for a legal response to engineered CDS
transactions.
Third, this Article examines whether any of the three sources of
law applicable to CDS can effectively cabin the attendant conse-
quences of engineered transactions. This analysis illuminates the
shortcomings of statutory law, contract law, and private law in limiting
the negative externalities arising from engineered CDS transactions.
From a legal standpoint, engineered CDS transactions exist in a gray
space beyond the reach of applicable sources of law that govern the
CDS market. Neither federal anti-manipulation laws and regulations
18 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 12 (discussing the McClatchy-Chatham transaction as
distinct from the Hovnanian trade because, unlike a bet where “CDS sellers bet that the
credit wouldn’t implode,” the McClatchy-Chatham trade was a “bet that [McClatchy’s]
credit would implode, and then it didn’t”).
19 See infra Section III.C.
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nor contract law limits engineered transactions. Legally, engineered
transactions do not constitute market manipulation, despite their dis-
tortive effect on the market.20 Contractually, these transactions are
not disallowed under the terms of the CDS contract and the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing does not invalidate them.21 Additionally,
this Article assesses ISDA’s recently adopted amendments to the
Master Agreement aimed at proscribing engineered transactions and
finds that despite some positive attributes, it is too narrow to mean-
ingfully respond to engineered transactions.
The costs of engineered transactions coupled with the limitations
of the existing legal framework render the market unprotected from
the harm that results from engineered CDS. Thus, this Article puts
forward three proposals to respond to engineered transactions. First,
it suggests an expansion of ISDA’s amendments to make it more
broadly applicable to all forms of engineered transactions. Second, it
recommends regulatory interventions to impose good faith obligations
on CDS market intermediaries, thereby re-establishing the duty of
good faith and fair dealing in the CDS contract. Third, it proposes
expanding the definition of price artificiality under anti-manipulation
laws to include legitimate but distortive trading strategies that nega-
tively impact the market’s price discovery process.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes how CDS
function, identifies participants within the CDS market, and examines
the role of ISDA in the market’s operation. Part II creates a typology
of engineered CDS transactions and, with the aid of market examples,
explains the varied ways in which CDS traders can exploit CDS con-
tracts to guarantee the profitability of their investments. Part III
examines the ex post and ex ante consequences of engineered CDS
transactions on issuers, CDS counterparties, and third parties. Fur-
ther, Part III assesses whether the market can force parties to inter-
nalize the externalities that accompany engineered transactions. Part
IV analyzes the application of relevant laws, regulations, and private
rules to engineered CDS transactions to demonstrate that these stan-
dards do not extend to prohibit or limit the detrimental effects of
20 See infra Section IV.A. A quick note about the scope of this Article. The definition
of market manipulation is beyond the scope of this Article and the absence of a definition
ought not to distract from the Article’s claims and analysis. Specifically, the Article
assesses two separate things—(i) whether engineered transactions distort the markets and
(ii) whether engineered transactions are legal, including if these transactions run afoul of
anti-manipulation laws. In answering the questions of distortion and legality, it is therefore
unnecessary for the Article to get into the debate regarding how to define market
manipulation. Rather, the Article considers objective, economic factors to assess questions
of distortion and the anti-manipulation legal framework to analyze issues of legality.
21 See infra Section IV.B.
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engineered transactions. In response to the shortcomings of the
existing framework, Part V explores pathways for reform that would
close the gap and limit the occurrence and impact of engineered
transactions.
I
AN OVERVIEW OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
At first blush, CDS may seem to be esoteric financial products.22
However, at its foundation, a CDS is an insurance-like financial con-
tract that enables parties to tailor their exposure to credit risk.23
Despite being described as “financial weapons of mass destruction”24
and decried as innovations with little to no social utility,25 CDS play
an important and useful role in the financial markets. The advent and
growth of CDS has revolutionized the credit market, enabling better
and easier transfer of credit risk among parties, which in turn
enhances market liquidity and enhances issuers’ access to credit.26
Since the execution of the first CDS transaction in 1994, the CDS
22 In this Article, CDS is used to refer to both the singular and plural forms.
23 Credit risk is the risk that a borrower may not be able to repay their debt and thus
default on their outstanding obligations. GEORGE CHACKO ET AL., CREDIT DERIVATIVES:
A PRIMER ON CREDIT RISK, MODELING, AND INSTRUMENTS 3–4 (2016). Credit risk is
present whenever one party extends credit to another party. A CDS allows parties to
transfer credit risk by providing “insurance” in the event of default. See Gina-Gail S.
Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of Hedging with Credit
Derivatives, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 813, 816 n.1 (2013–2014). Although the insurance
analogy is useful, it is incomplete, as discussed infra, because there is no requirement that
the protection seller have an insurable interest in the referenced debt obligation. See Eric
A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable
Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century Financial Markets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1307,
1321–22 (2013) (discussing the insurable interest requirement for insurance products that is
absent in financial products, like CDS); see also Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates
Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE
L.J. 701, 721 (1999) (discussing the insurable interest requirement at common law and that
its absence in derivatives results in these instruments being gambling contracts that ought
to be illegal).
24 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to
Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 13–15 (Feb. 21, 2003), http://
www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf (warning of the dangers of credit
derivatives, and calling derivatives “time bombs” and “financial weapons of mass
destruction”).
25 See Press Release, The Vatican, “‘Oeconomicae et Pecuniariae Quaestiones’.
Considerations for an Ethical Discernment Regarding Some Aspects of the Present
Economic-Financial System” of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and the
Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development (May 17, 2018), http://
press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2018/05/17/180517a.html
(stating that the spread of CDS is “unacceptable from the ethical point of view”).
26 See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1022–27 (2007) (discussing the major benefits
associated with CDS).
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market has grown exponentially and, prior to the 2008 financial crisis,
was one of the largest markets in the world.27 Today, the CDS market
has shrunk in size, but its role is no less important. Engineered CDS
transactions, however, undermine the utility of the CDS markets, pro-
viding another basis on which the instruments’ utility may be called
into question.
Part I lays the groundwork for understanding CDS and the CDS
market. First, it explains the mechanics underlying CDS, including
how payments are triggered and the incentives that these transactions
create among counterparties. Next, Part I describes the CDS markets,
highlighting the major players in the market, as well as the benefits
and drawbacks of CDS. Lastly, Part I specifically discusses the role of
ISDA in the CDS markets as the sole source of private rules for CDS
market participants.
A. A Primer on CDS
A CDS is a type of credit derivative28 in which one party (the
“protection seller”) agrees to compensate the other party (the “pro-
tection buyer”) in the event the debt issuer (the “reference entity” or
“underlying”) experiences a “credit event,” such as a default or a
credit rating downgrade.29 In exchange, the protection buyer pays
periodic premiums to the protection seller.30 If a credit event occurs,
the protection buyer is entitled to a payoff.31 On the other hand, if a
27 Robert Smith, Credit Default Swaps: A $10tn Market that Leaves Few Happy, FIN.
TIMES (July 24, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/10af64da-7075-11e7-93ff-99f383b09ff9.
Immediately preceding the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, the CDS market had an
outstanding notional value of almost $60 trillion. Since the crisis, the market has shrunk
considerably, with the outstanding value in 2016 approximating $10 trillion. Id.
28 A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is derived from the value of an
underlying reference asset—such as a security, commodity, interest rate, etc.—or an
external event. A credit derivative is a financial contract for which the payout depends on
the credit performance of a corporation or sovereign (i.e., whether the reference entity
defaults on its debts). See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 824–32 (discussing the different forms
of credit derivatives).
29 Robert S. Bloink, Does the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act Rein in Credit
Default Swaps? An EU Comparative Analysis, 89 NEB. L. REV. 587, 594 (2011) (“A . . .
credit default swap (CDS) is a bilateral contract under which a protection seller promises
to make good on the protection buyer’s losses in the event that the entity . . . that issued
the CDS’s underlying bond defaults on its debt obligations prior to the maturity of the
CDS.”).
30  PRACTICAL LAW FIN., supra note 6, at 2. (“In return for the credit protection seller
assuming this credit risk, the credit protection buyer makes periodic premium payments
over the term of the swap to the credit protection seller.”).
31 “Credit events” are defined by the ISDA to include “bankruptcy, failure to pay,
obligation acceleration, obligation default, repudiation/moratorium, or restructuring.”
INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2003 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS 30
(2003), http://cbs.db.com/new/docs/2003_ISDA_Credit_Derivatives_Definitions.pdf.
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credit event does not occur during the contractual period, the protec-
tion seller profits on the premiums collected during the life of the
contract.
Credit events are contractually defined performance triggers that
determine whether a protection buyer is entitled to compensation.32
Deciding whether a credit event has occurred is the responsibility of
the Credit Derivatives Determinations Committee.33 Each
Determinations Committee is comprised of fifteen members, ten of
whom are major CDS dealers.34 Its decisions must be made by a
supermajority and are binding on market participants.35 Any eligible
CDS market participant may request that the Determinations
Committee resolve whether there has been a triggering credit event.36
If the Determinations Committee decides that there has been a credit
event, the Committee holds a centralized auction to establish the set-
tlement price of the underlying asset.37 The settlement price is estab-
lished by reference to the lowest-priced bond trading on the market
(i.e., the cheapest to deliver).38 Once a settlement price has been set,
the CDS protection buyer is entitled to a payout valued at the differ-
ence between the par value of the bond (the face value) and the auc-
tion-established settlement price of the bond.39
32 Id.
33 INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, THE ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES
DETERMINATIONS COMMITTEES 1 (2012), https://www.isda.org/a/CHDDE/agm-2012-dc-
anniversary-appendix-043012.pdf.
34 Id. at 2. See infra Section I.B for a discussion of CDS dealers.
35 INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, supra note 33, at 3, 8.
36 See id.
37 Id. at 1.
38 Fabien Carruzzo et al., iHeart and Other Unconventional CDS Credit Events,
WESTLAW 1, 2 (May 17, 2017) (explaining how when a credit event occurs for the reference
entity, “a credit protection seller must pay to its protection buyer an amount equal to the
percentage in decline in the value, compared to par, of the ‘cheapest to deliver’ qualifying
debt obligation of the reference entity . . . .”). The mechanics underlying how the
Determination Committee establishes the cheapest-to-deliver bond are beyond the scope
of this Article. In a nutshell, the cheapest-to-deliver bond is the lowest-valued bond
covered by the CDS that is presented at the auction for purchase. By valuing the payoff
according to the lowest-valued bond, the Determinations Committee ensures that all
protection buyers receive the same payoff value (i.e., par minus the cheapest-to-deliver
bond), by establishing the lowest possible price the market is willing to pay for the
defaulted issuer’s bond. For more details on the process and benefits of the Determinations
Committee’s auction process, see Short-Squeeze Risks Loom Again in CDS Markets,
JONES DAY (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.jonesday.com/Short-Squeeze-Risks-Loom-Again-
in-CDS-Markets-01-11-2019.
39 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, THE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP MARKET 3 (2012),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD385.pdf (“[I]f ‘cash settlement’ is the
agreed settlement method, the seller must pay to the buyer the difference between the
notional contract value and the market value of the bonds.”).
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An example may be helpful to further explain the mechanics and
payoff valuation of CDS. Assume that Widgets Inc. (Widgets) issues a
$40 million bond that matures in five years.40 An investor, Ingrid,
purchases $1 million of Widgets’ bonds at par value.41 The bond
exposes Ingrid to credit risk, that is, the risk that Widgets may not be
able to repay its debt in five years. To protect herself against Widgets’
credit risk, Ingrid, the protection buyer, may purchase a CDS on the
$1 million Widgets bond, which transfers the risk of loss from Widgets’
default from Ingrid to her CDS counterparty—State Bank of
Portlandia (BP), the protection seller. Per the CDS agreement, Ingrid
makes contractually specified periodic premium payments to her CDS
counterparty, BP.
The CDS protects Ingrid from the decline in value of Widgets’
bonds if Widgets is unable to repay its debt. Meanwhile, BP receives a
steady stream of payments during the life of the CDS contract, which
will be its profit if Widgets does not default. If Widgets defaults, and
the ISDA Determinations Committee decides that the default consti-
tutes a credit event, BP owes Ingrid the difference between the par
value of Widgets’ bonds and the cheapest-to-deliver bond established
through an ISDA auction. Thus, if post-default, the cheapest Widgets
bonds trade at ten cents on the dollar, BP must compensate Ingrid
$900,000—the difference between par value ($1,000,000) and the price
of the cheapest-to-deliver bond ($100,000).
When one considers the Widgets example, it becomes evident
that both BP and Ingrid have competing preferences and interests
with respect to Widgets’ future solvency. On the one hand, BP would
prefer for Widgets to remain solvent, as this would allow it to profit on
the premiums it charged Ingrid for credit protection. BP’s obligation
to make Ingrid whole in the event of Widgets’ defaults reduces the
profitability of the CDS transaction for BP. Further, if BP did not
charge enough for the credit protection, it may experience a financial
40 A bond is a type of security in which an issuer, such as a corporation, municipality, or
sovereign, borrows money for a defined period from investors, known as bondholders.
Bondholders are creditors of the issuer and may be entitled to receive periodic interest
payments until the bond matures.
41 Par value is the face value of the bonds. It is not necessarily what the investor pays
for the bonds. For example, a bond may have a par value of $100 but it is being sold below
par at $97. In this case, the original purchase price of the bond is below par. However, in
determining the payout for a CDS, it is the par value that is used in determining the
payments owed if there is a credit event. See Lionel Pavey, Credit Default Swap; What Is It
– Good or Bad?, TREASURYXL (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.treasuryxl.com/news-articles/
credit-default-swap-good-bad (“[W]hen the CDS market started, it was seen as a product
to protect bond holders and, in the event of a default, the CDS buyer could deliver the
agreed reference obligation and receive its par value.”).
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loss if the premiums it collected are less than the amount owed to
Ingrid.
On the other hand, Ingrid may prefer that Widgets defaults but
the reasons for this are less obvious at first glance. To start, in the
above hypothetical, Ingrid has hedged her exposure to Widgets’ credit
risk and, with all things being equal, she ought to be agnostic as to
Widgets’ default. However, as a bondholder that has hedged her
credit exposure to Widget, Ingrid becomes an “empty creditor” that
may stand to profit more from Widgets’ default than from its con-
tinued solvency.42 In purchasing a $1 million bond from Widgets that
matures in five years, Ingrid is entitled to a repayment of her $1 mil-
lion investment plus any periodic interest payments due over the life
of the bond. If Widgets later faces financial distress, it likely will ask
its bondholders, like Ingrid, to restructure its debt, which may involve
a reduction on the outstanding debt, an extension of the payment
date, or some combination thereof. Whereas restructuring the debt
may result in losses for Ingrid, she could recoup her investment (less
transaction costs) if Widgets defaults and her counterparty, BP, com-
pensates her per their CDS. Thus, as an empty creditor, Ingrid may be
unwilling to work with Widgets to restructure its debt and would,
instead, prefer that Widgets defaults.43
Ingrid’s preference for Widgets’ default is more pronounced
when the above example is modified such that she has no pre-existing
exposure to Widgets’ credit risk through a bond. In this scenario,
Ingrid purchases “naked” credit protection on Widgets’ debt as a
speculator and, therefore, she is no longer agnostic as to whether or
not Widgets defaults. Rather, the only way in which she profits on the
CDS transaction is if Widgets defaults. As a speculator, Ingrid pays
her periodic premiums just as she would as a hedger, but she receives
no return on the investment if Widgets remains solvent during the life
of the CDS. Thus, Ingrid is incentivized to encourage Widgets’ default
to ensure the profitability of her CDS.
The preferences that Ingrid, the protection buyer, and BP, the
protection seller, face—to encourage or prevent Widgets’ default,
respectively—arise from the innate structure of the CDS. Specifically,
the ability to use CDS to place naked bets on the likelihood of default
42 Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II:
Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 732 (2008) (“[A]n empty creditor may
prefer to force the company into bankruptcy, rather than agree to a restructuring, because
the bankruptcy filing will trigger a contractual payoff on its swap position.”).
43 For a fuller discussion and analysis of the empty creditor problem, see Patrick Bolton
& Martin Oehmke, Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem, 24 REV. FIN.
STUD. 2617 (2011).
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of the underlying issuer creates incentives for CDS counterparties to
distort the utility of CDS, which can disrupt the CDS market in signifi-
cant ways.
B. The CDS Market
In the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, CDS trans-
formed from obscure, high-finance products into popular, widely-
traded financial instruments. In 2007, at the peak of the CDS market,
the outstanding notional value of CDS exceeded $60 trillion.44 Post-
crisis, the CDS market has shrunk considerably, with recent reports
estimating the outstanding notional value of CDS contracts at approx-
imately $10 trillion.45 The primary buyers and sellers of CDS are
known as “swap dealers” and include many of the largest financial
institutions globally, such as J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, Credit
Suisse, and UBS, among others.46 The top fourteen CDS dealers are
counterparties to ninety percent of the outstanding notional value of
CDS.
Swap dealers act as market makers and are willing to take the
opposite side of a CDS trade with another dealer or a non-dealer.47
The CFTC and the SEC share regulatory authority over swap dealers,
requiring them to register with the respective agency in order to par-
ticipate in the CDS market.48 In registering, swap dealers are subject
to extensive regulations as a requirement of participating in the CDS
market. They must report trades, comply with capital and margin
44 Iñaki Aldasoro & Torsten Ehlers, The Credit Default Swap Market: What a
Difference a Decade Makes, 2018 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV. 1, 2 (June 2018)
(“In terms of notional amounts outstanding, the [global CDS] market has seen a
continuous decline after peaking at roughly $61.2 trillion at end-2007 . . . .”). With CDS,
“notional value” refers to the “maximum potential counterparty exposure of the
protection seller to the protection buyer.” Id. at 3.
45 See id. at 3 fig.1; Smith, supra note 27.
46 The complete list of top CDS dealers includes: Bank of America, Barclays, BNP
Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan
Chase, Morgan Stanley, Royal Bank of Scotland, Société Générale, UBS, and Wells Fargo.
DAVID MENGLE, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, CONCENTRATION OF OTC
DERIVATIVES AMONG MAJOR DEALERS 1, 2 n.2 (2010), https://www.isda.org/a/VSiDE/
concentrationrn-4-10.pdf.
47 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 39, at 18.
48 See 17 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(3) (2018). Three caveats must be noted here. First, registration
is required for an entity or individual to participate in any segment of the swaps market,
not only CDS. However, in light of the focus of the Article, the emphasis will be on CDS.
Second, in referring generally to “swaps,” the Article is referring both to swaps (which fall
under the purview of the CFTC) and security-based swaps (which fall under the purview of
the SEC). Third, the Commissions also have authority over a class of actors named “major
swap participants.” The Article is not including them in the discussion above because (i) no
entity is currently registered as a major swap participant and (ii) the rules applicable to
major swap participants largely mirror those related to swap dealers.
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requirements, and establish risk management protocols to monitor
credit, liquidity, legal, and operational risks.49 Swap dealers are
intermediaries in the CDS market, profiting mostly on facilitating the
transaction and offsetting their exposure whenever possible. In con-
trast, non-dealers trade in CDS to hedge their credit exposure or,
alternately, to gain exposure to credit risk.50 Non-dealers include
smaller banks, other financial institutions, institutional investors (such
as pension funds and mutual funds), and hedge funds, among others.51
CDS are versatile financial instruments that can be used either to
hedge against or speculate on credit risk. When used to hedge, a CDS
counterparty has preexisting exposure to the reference entity’s (i.e.,
the issuer) credit risk through a bond or loan, and the CDS provides
insurance against this risk. Prior to the introduction of CDS, a bond
investor or lender would have to sell all or some of its risk exposure to
minimize the credit risk of the reference entity. However, an investor
may only want to mitigate some of the risk or may only want to do so
for a specified period. Furthermore, selling and repurchasing the debt
would involve additional transaction costs that would increase the
investor’s costs and decrease the available capital for the markets.
With CDS, a debt investor can protect against credit risk with fewer
transaction costs and greater precision. Non-dealers, such as pension
funds and mutual funds for example, typically utilize CDS to hedge
their credit risk exposure, relying on the insurance-like features of
CDS to manage their risk profile.52 Thus, the malleability of CDS
enables investors to customize their risk profile, such that they only
bear credit risk linked to specific industries, for a certain time, or up to
a specified level.53
49 See Capital Requirements of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed.
Reg. 91,252 (Dec. 16, 2016) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 23, 140).
50 See Intermediaries, CFTC, https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/Intermediaries/
index.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2019) (defining a “swap dealer” as an actor who
“[r]egularly enters into swaps with counterparties as an ordinary course of business for its
own account; or [e]ngages in any activity causing the person to be commonly known in the
trade as a dealer or market maker in swaps”). See generally GIULIO GIRARDI, CRAIG
LEWIS & MILA GETMANSKY, INTERCONNECTEDNESS IN THE CDS MARKET (2014), https://
www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/credit-defaul-swaps-interconnectivity-04-
2014.pdf (discussing the increasing interconnectedness among dealers and non-dealers in
the CDS market and its effect on overall market stability).
51 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 39, at 6.
52 See M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not ‘Insurance,’ 16 CONN. INS. L.J.
1, 9 (2009) (“The participants in this market are large commercial banks, as risk sellers, and
. . . hedge funds [and] pension funds . . . as risk buyers. In this way, CDS contracts resemble
other risk-sharing arrangements, like the syndication of credit or the sale of loans by
banks.”).
53 See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 26, at 1024 (“[CDS] can be combined with . . . other
derivatives to create almost any desired risk profile. If the lender wishes to bear a
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CDS may also be used to speculate on an issuer’s credit risk.
Unlike hedgers that have prior credit risk exposure to the reference
entity, speculators have no credit risk exposure prior to purchasing a
CDS, thus making their CDS “naked.”54 Naked CDS allow investors
to gamble on the likelihood of default, and they have become the
more prevalent use of CDS in the market.55 With naked CDS, traders
can speculate on the creditworthiness of debt issuers, without incur-
ring the transaction costs to buy or sell the underlying debt. For
example, suppose an investor believes that Widgets is likely to default
on its upcoming bond payments. Without CDS, the investor would
have to short Widgets’ bonds, thereby incurring additional transaction
costs and risks.56 With CDS, the investor can mimic a short sale by
purchasing naked credit protection against Widgets’ outstanding debt,
which incurs lower transaction costs; if Widgets defaults, the investor
will receive a payoff, and if it does not, she has lost the premium
payments.57
Despite its shrinking size, the CDS market is nonetheless an
important segment of the financial markets, and turmoil in the CDS
market can have significant repercussions in the wider financial mar-
kets. CDS, particularly naked CDS, amplify the consequences of
default, because the issuer’s default results in losses not only for bond-
holders, but also for counterparties to CDS related to the issuer’s
debt. Given that the value of outstanding CDS on publicly-traded
debt is many times higher than the value of the outstanding debt, an
ill-timed default by a major issuer could have significant ripple effects
throughout the markets.58 The impact of default is further magnified
borrower’s firm-specific default risk, but not risk related to [an industry], the lender could
purchase derivatives that would compensate the lender in the event of an industry
downturn . . . .”).
54 Henderson, supra note 52, at 17.
55 See David McIlroy, The Regulatory Issues Raised by Credit Default Swaps, 11 J.
BANKING REG. 303, 308 (2010) (“[I]n January 2009, [it was] estimated that as much as 80
per cent of the CDS market is traded by companies that do not own the underlying debt.”);
see also DOMINIC O’KANE, MODELLING SINGLE-NAME AND MULTI-NAME CREDIT
DERIVATIVES 1 (2008) (explaining that in 2007, the amount of credit derivatives
outstanding was estimated to be $45.46 trillion, comparing to the bond market which was
estimated to be $5.7 trillion).
56 Additional transaction costs would include the costs to borrow the securities and fees
for the sale and repurchase of the securities. Further, if the price of Widgets’ bonds does
not decrease, the investor will be forced to repurchase the securities at a higher price and,
if there is a limited supply of the bonds, this also increases her risks.
57 See supra Section I.A (explaining through use of a hypothetical example how CDS
may be used to speculate on the likelihood of default).
58 See The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis
Inquiry Comm’n, 111th Cong. 17–18 (2010) (statement of Michael Greenberger, Professor,
University of Maryland School of Law) (describing the ripple effect that occurred during
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by the fact that most CDS transactions are highly leveraged,59 and,
consequently, even small market changes may have a profound
market-wide impact.60 Default by an issuer, therefore, may require
credit protection sellers to make significant payoffs that may threaten
the protection sellers’ viability and financial stability. Additionally,
CDS increase interconnections among large, systemically important
financial institutions.61 The top fourteen CDS dealers enter into over
sixty percent of CDS transactions.62 The concentrated nature of the
CDS market creates a web of contractual relationships among large
financial institutions that increase the risk that CDS losses at one insti-
tution could trigger cascading losses throughout the financial mar-
kets.63 Thus, the stability of the CDS markets is essential to the proper
functioning of the broader financial markets. Attempts to distort or
otherwise undermine the CDS markets, therefore, ought to be
addressed promptly so as to minimize the potential far-reaching con-
sequences of such conduct.
C. The Role of ISDA
Key to the development and growth of the CDS market was
standardization of the CDS contract, an effort spearheaded by
ISDA.64 Founded in 1985, ISDA is a global financial trade association
the 2008 financial crisis), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-
0630-Greenberger.pdf; see also McIlroy, supra note 55, at 308 (“[I]n January 2009, Eric
Dinallo estimated that as much as 80 per cent of the CDS market is traded by companies
that do not own the underlying debt.”).
59 “[A] transaction is leveraged when a counterparty does not commit capital to cover
the full amount of its future obligation under the contract.” Fletcher, supra note 23, at
895–96. For example, in entering into a CDS contract, the protection seller is not required
to commit the full value of the CDS to demonstrate its ability to pay. Rather, the
protection seller typically pledges a percentage of the value of the contract as collateral,
but otherwise the transaction is highly leveraged.
60 See Yesha Yadav, The Case for a Market in Debt Governance, 67 VAND. L. REV. 771,
792 (2014) (explaining that the amount and quality of the collateral that protection buyers
demand from protection sellers depends on the risk presented by the entity that originally
borrowed from the lender, and not the full value of the CDS itself).
61 See generally STÉPHANE CRÉPEY, MONIQUE JEANBLANC & BEHNAZ ZARGARI,
COUNTERPARTY RISK ON A CDS IN A MARKOV CHAIN COPULA MODEL WITH JOINT
DEFAULTS (2009).
62 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 39, at 6.
63 Johnson, supra note 5, at 213.
64 See ROMAIN G. RANCIERE, INT’L MONETARY FUND, CREDIT DERIVATIVES IN
EMERGING MARKETS 4 (2002), https://econ-papers.upf.edu/papers/856.pdf (“The
standardization of the legal documentation has been a driven [sic] force in the
development of the credit derivatives market. Based on the 1999 Credit Derivatives
Definitions issued by the International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA), the new
ISDA confirmation form has turned default swaps into plain vanilla derivatives
products . . . .”).
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that was established to standardize documentation for the derivatives
markets and reduce the significant transaction costs that accompanied
derivatives trades.65 To this end, ISDA created the Master
Agreement, which is the foundational contract for all CDS trades.66
The Master Agreement delineates the obligations of parties, defines
what constitutes a credit event, and details procedures for early termi-
nation and transfer of CDS contracts, among other things.67 Parties
may modify default provisions in the Master Agreement by including
their amendments in the “Schedule.”68 Together, the Master
Agreement and the Schedule form the contractual basis for all CDS
transactions between counterparties.
In standardizing the foundational documents for CDS trades,
ISDA reduced transaction costs which, in turn, has fostered the
expansion of the CDS markets. Notably, the creation of a private legal
infrastructure to govern CDS raised questions regarding the legal
validity of CDS contracts and the potential for uncertainty in judicial
interpretation of contract terms, particularly across different jurisdic-
tions and legal regimes.69 In furtherance of these goals, ISDA has
sought and received assurances from over thirty countries that ISDA’s
provisions are enforceable as law.70 ISDA also plays a prominent role
in litigation related to the interpretation of the Master Agreement,
writing amicus briefs and issuing its own contract interpretation.71
As the standard setter for the CDS market, ISDA intervenes
when judicial or regulatory interpretation of the Master Agreement
65 Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps,
Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 178 (2007).
66 See Irene Spagna, Becoming the World’s Biggest Market: OTC Derivatives Before the
Global Financial Crisis of 2008, in GOVERNING THE WORLD’S BIGGEST MARKET: THE
POLITICS OF DERIVATIVES REGULATION AFTER THE 2008 CRISIS 27, 41 (Eric Helleiner et
al. eds., 2018) (“[The ISDA Master Agreement] provided industry-wide accepted
definitions of key terms . . . which could be used across a variety of transactions.”).
67 See PRACTICAL LAW FIN., RESOURCE ID NO. 1-386-3976, ISDA DOCUMENTS:
OVERVIEW (US), Westlaw (last visited Mar. 15, 2019) (explaining the role of ISDA in the
derivatives market).
68 Schwartz, supra note 65, at 178 (“If parties desire to modify any default provisions in
the Master Agreement for their transaction, they may do so in an amending document
called a ‘Schedule.’”).
69 GEOFFREY P. MILLER & FABRIZIO CAFAGGI, THE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION
OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 58–59 (2013).
70 Frank Partnoy, ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: The Four Horsemen of
Derivatives Regulation? 5–6 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 39, 2002).
71 See Amicus Briefs, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, https://www.isda.org/1970/
01/01/amicus-briefs (last visited Aug. 3, 2019) (“ISDA files amicus briefs . . . in court cases
around the world that raise important policy issues that impact the over-the-counter
derivatives market and market participants.”).
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may result in ambiguity or disruptions to the CDS market.72 One
prominent example involved questions as to whether Argentina’s
“voluntary debt exchange” on its outstanding bonds constituted a
credit event under the Master Agreement.73 At the time, a mandatory
debt exchange, known as an “Obligation Exchange” was deemed a
credit event.74 But it was unclear whether the Argentine debt
exchange, despite being labelled “voluntary,” was in fact voluntary.75
Concerned about the potential far-reaching ramifications of the ambi-
guity, ISDA acted quickly and decisively. It removed “Obligation
Exchanges” from the definition of a credit event and convened a
group of experts to revise the credit event definitions in the Master
Agreement.76
To address the essential question of whether a CDS reference
entity has defaulted, ISDA established Determinations Committees to
make binding decisions on whether a credit event has occurred.77 In
forming the Determinations Committee, ISDA created a private,
industry-led body to govern a key element of the Master Agreement,
enhancing market certainty.78 Generally, ISDA and the
Determinations Committee adopt a textualist approach to inter-
preting the Master Agreement, with little to no consideration of extra-
neous evidence or factors.79 In embracing a textualist and formalistic
approach to the Master Agreement, ISDA aims to have courts and
CDS parties rely exclusively on the contract text in interpreting
related rights and obligations. ISDA’s textualist interpretation of the
Master Agreement focuses on the terms of the contract as written,
with little regard for the negative effects that arise from strict applica-
tion of the contract. ISDA’s stance on the Greek debt crisis is an illus-
72 Anna Gelpern, Domestic Bonds, Credit Derivatives, and the Next Transformation of
Sovereign Debt, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 171 (2008) (describing ISDA as the “unofficial
guardian” of the CDS market that intervenes when a court’s interpretation of the Master
Agreement may “unsettle market expectations”).
73 See supra text accompanying notes 28–36; Eternity Glob. Master Fund Ltd. v.
Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 375 F.3d 168, 177–78 (2d Cir. 2004). More specifically, per the
Master Agreement a “Restructuring” constituted a credit event and included “Obligation
Exchanges.” At issue was whether the Argentine “voluntary debt exchange” was
mandatory and, therefore, a credit event, or voluntary and, therefore, not. Id. at 180.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 181.
76 See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129,
1144 (2006).
77 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 39, at 12.
78 See generally Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, CDS Zombies, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.
REV. 347 (2012) (discussing the establishment of Determinations Committees and their
benefits for the CDS markets).
79 See generally id. (discussing ISDA’s textualist approach to its interpretation of the
Master Agreement, specifically in relation to the Greek debt crisis).
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trative example in this regard. To determine whether Greece’s
proposed restructuring triggered CDS payments, ISDA narrowly and
inflexibly interpreted the text of the Master Agreement to decide that
Greece’s restructuring was not a credit event legally, even though eco-
nomically and practically the country was in default.80
Despite the importance of ISDA to the CDS markets, it is not
subject to any regulatory oversight nor does it have authority over
market participants.81 ISDA is not an administrative agency nor is it a
quasi-governmental agency akin to the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority. Fundamentally, ISDA is a trade association,82 in which
major dealers, its primary members, dominate the organization and
exert considerable influence over its operation.83 After the 2008 crisis,
the Dodd-Frank Act brought the derivative market, including the
CDS market, within the regulatory ambit of the CFTC and the SEC.84
However, ISDA remains beyond the jurisdictional scope of either
agency, while simultaneously maintaining significant influence within
the CDS market.85 Further, ISDA has little authority to enforce its
rules or punish members who fail to comply.86 Market adherence to
the Master Agreement and any amendments thereto that ISDA
adopts, for example, are entirely voluntary.87 Yet, because of its
80 See Greek Sovereign Debt Q&A (Update), INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N (July
25, 2011), https://www.isda.org/2011/07/25/greek-sovereign-debt-qa-update (stating that a
voluntary debt exchange would not trigger a Credit Event).
81 See Kathryn Collard, Note, Advantages of a Co-Regulatory OTC Derivatives Regime,
46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 877, 979 (2015) (describing ISDA as a “private industry group” that is
not formally involved in shaping the regulatory framework that governs the derivatives
market).
82 See Mark J. Roe & Stephen D. Adams, Restructuring Failed Financial Firms in
Bankruptcy: Selling Lehman’s Derivatives Portfolio, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 398 n.102
(2015) (“ISDA . . . began as the major derivatives banks’ trade association.”).
83 ISDA has three membership classes: (i) primary members, which includes derivatives
dealers; (ii) associate members, which includes professional service providers in the
derivatives markets; and (iii) subscribers, which includes anyone not eligible for the first
two membership classes. However, only primary members have voting rights and are
eligible to serve as officers and directors of ISDA. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N,
BY-LAWS 2 (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.isda.org/a/cDOEE/ISDA-By-Laws-March-14-
2018.pdf.
84 Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8344
(2012).
85 See John Biggins, ‘Targeted Touchdown’ and ‘Partial Liftoff’: Post-Crisis Dispute
Resolution in the OTC Derivatives Markets and the Challenges for ISDA, 13 GERMAN L.J.
1297, 1311–12 (2012) (stating that in the wake of the global financial crisis, ISDA has
enmeshed itself in the regulatory process, working alongside regulators as they establish
central clearing and exchange of derivatives).
86 See Johnson, supra note 5, at 231.
87 See, e.g. , U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-716, CREDIT
DERIVATIVES: CONFIRMATION BACKLOGS INCREASED DEALERS’ OPERATIONAL RISKS,
BUT WERE SUCCESSFULLY ADDRESSED AFTER JOINT REGULATORY ACTION 25 (2007),
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importance to the CDS market, market participants generally adhere
to ISDA’s best practices, trading rules, and interpretive guidance,
thereby making it the de facto leader of the derivatives market.88
In sum, despite being separate from and unaccountable to the
CDS regulatory framework, ISDA has considerable influence over the
CDS market. By acting as a standard-setter for derivatives, ISDA has
been pivotal to the growth of the CDS market. Nonetheless, the lack
of accountability coupled with its private, member-focused interests
are a cause for concern, particularly within the CDS market. As the
CDS market continues to evolve, the question arises as to whether
leaving the CDS market beholden to ISDA, under the control of large
dealers, and beyond the scope of regulatory authority, is best for the
market and market participants. This is true particularly in light of the
development of engineered CDS transactions, which only received
attention from ISDA after the CFTC publicly denounced the
transactions.
II
ENGINEERED CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS: TYPOLOGY AND
MARKET EXAMPLES
Engineered CDS first appeared within the past six years;89 since
then, the schemes have become bolder, more creative, and more con-
cerning.90 This Article defines an engineered CDS transaction as one
in which a CDS counterparty (or a group working together) takes
affirmative steps to guarantee that its CDS position is profitable. That
is to say, if the counterparty is a protection buyer, it ensures that the
CDS payoff is triggered; if it is a protection seller, it ensures that the
CDS payoff is not triggered. Thus, the CDS counterparty uses its
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07716.pdf (describing adherence to ISDA protocols as
“voluntary”).
88 See A. Claire Cutler, The Judicialization of Private Transnational Power and
Authority, 25 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 61, 80–81 (2015) (explaining how ISDA’s
impact on the derivatives market is reflected by “the sheer volume of” market participants
who use the association’s standardized agreements); Andrew Verstein, Ex Tempore
Contracting, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1869, 1909–10 (2014) (“Preference for ISDA
documentation is partially a result of strong network externalities in the form of
comprehensibility and fungibility in the eyes of other market participants.”).
89 PRACTICAL LAW FIN. ET AL., RESOURCE ID NO. W-014-1708, UNDERSTANDING
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS (CDS): OPPORTUNISTIC STRATEGIES, Westlaw (last visited Mar.
15, 2019) (“Engineered defaults . . . have been around for some time now – at least since
Codere in 2013 . . . .”).
90 See Charles W. Murdock, Credit Default Swaps: Dubious Instruments, 3 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 133, 134–36 (2013) (citing, among other factors, the unique nature of CDS
transactions in impeding proper CDS pricing, JP Morgan’s two billion dollar loss in
trading, and a lack of due diligence in the banking industry as strengthening his notion of a
“faulty rationale of credit default swaps”).
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resources to tilt the outcome of the CDS to favor its position and
increase the profitability of the contract. Notably, because of the
short-term horizon for engineered CDS transactions, they are most
profitable with financially distressed or near-distressed issuers.
Part II examines the phenomenon of engineered CDS transac-
tions. It creates a typology to classify the strategies that counterparties
employ to guarantee their preferred CDS outcome and, with the aid
of market examples, describes the mechanics underlying these trans-
actions. This Article classifies engineered transactions into three cate-
gories: (i) manufacturing default—CDS protection buyer incentivizing
the issuer to voluntarily default on its outstanding debt; (ii) avoiding
default—CDS protection seller providing a loan to temporarily fore-
stall the issuer’s default; and (iii) negating default—CDS protection
seller restructuring the debt of the issuer to eliminate future possi-
bility of default. Each is discussed in greater detail below.
A. Manufacturing Default: The Cases of Codere & Hovnanian
The most controversial strategy CDS traders use to engineer CDS
outcomes is manufactured default. In this scenario, the CDS protec-
tion buyer offers the issuer financing terms more favorable than the
issuer could have received from the markets. In exchange, the issuer
agrees to default on an outstanding debt, thereby triggering a credit
event under the CDS agreement. With manufactured defaults, the
issuer’s default is voluntary—that is to say, in the absence of the CDS
protection buyer’s offer of financing, the issuer would meet its debt
obligations. And, in some instances, the default is merely technical as
the issuer eventually makes the required payments but does so late,
thereby triggering a credit event.91 Thus, otherwise solvent issuers
consciously decide not to pay their debt obligations—manufacturing
default—as a condition of their financing agreement and for the ben-
efit of the CDS protection buyer that supplies the financing.
Manufactured defaults are most feasible and profitable with dis-
tressed companies for two reasons. First, a distressed company likely
has limited access to the credit markets and, therefore, would be
willing to accept financing in exchange for default. Further, if its finan-
cial situation is extremely precarious, a default may not have much of
an impact on its credit rating; the company would, therefore, have
little to lose and much to gain in the form of financing that would be
91 Under the ISDA Master Agreement, payments received after the thirty-day grace
period are deemed late, thereby putting the issuer in default. See ISDA, 2014 ISDA Credit
Derivatives Definitions, Master Agreement Section 4.5 (defining a failure to pay with
reference to the expiration of a “Grace Period” as defined in Section 1.45, if no Grace
Period is specified in the contract, as thirty calendar days).
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otherwise unavailable. Second, in the event of a credit event, CDS
payouts are valued at the difference between the par value of the ref-
erenced bonds and the cheapest-to-deliver bonds.92 The bonds of a
company facing financial distress are likely trading significantly below
par value, thereby providing the CDS investor with an opportunity to
profit in the event of a default. Again, if the profits from the issuer’s
default are larger than the cost of extending financing to the issuer to
incentivize it to default, then it could be worthwhile for a CDS protec-
tion buyer to engage in this transaction.93
To date, engineered CDS transactions that involve voluntary
defaults have been the most controversial because to many, this
strategy most closely resembles cheating.94 Two well-known examples
of engineered CDS transactions, involving Codere and Hovnanian,
relied on manufactured defaults to guarantee payoffs for protection
buyers. The two examples are discussed together because (i) the pro-
tection buyer in each case was GSO Capital Partners, a subsidiary of
Blackstone, so there are striking similarities in the schemes; and (ii)
when viewed in succession, one sees how the strategy evolved to capi-
talize on the idiosyncrasies and structure of the CDS market.
1. Codere
One of the first known manufactured default transactions
involved Codere, a publicly traded Spanish firm that operates race
tracks and betting parlors. In 2013, Codere was experiencing financial
difficulties, as it posted its sixth consecutive quarterly loss and was
largely unable to access additional financing.95 GSO purchased credit
protection on Codere debt, betting on the company’s insolvency.
However, rather than waiting to see if Codere would make its
92 See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 39, at 3; see also supra notes 40–42 and
accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., Matt Levine, Blackstone Made Money on Credit-Default Swaps with This
One Weird Trick , BLOOMBERG OPINION (Dec. 5, 2013, 5:47 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-12-05/blackstone-made-money-on-credit-default-
swaps-with-this-one-weird-trick. Levine explains that in 2013, GSO extended a one
hundred million dollar loan with favorable terms to Codere, and in exchange, Codere
would intentionally default on some of its loan obligations. Therefore, GSO made between
eleven million and fourteen million euros from its CDS contracts. Id.
94 See Davide Scigliuzzo, CFTC Steps into Debate on Voluntary Defaults, REUTERS
(Apr. 27, 2018, 12:43 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cftc/cftc-steps-into-debate-
on-voluntary-defaults-idUSKBN1HY2FY (explaining that many have agreed with the
CFTC statement that intentional defaults “could amount to market manipulation”).
95 Stephanie Ruhle, Mary Childs & Julie Miecamp, Blackstone Unit Wins in No-Lose
Codere Trade: Corporate Finance, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 22, 2013, 10:02 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-22/blackstone-unit-wins-in-no-lose-codere-
trade-corporate-finance (discussing the loan provided by GSO Capital Partners LP to
Codere SA).
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upcoming debt payment, GSO intervened. Specifically, GSO, along
with other lenders, offered Codere a much-needed $100 million loan
on favorable terms, but with an important condition: If Codere was on
time in making its next debt payment, it would be required to repay
the $100 million loan immediately, in full.96 Ultimately, Codere was
two days late in making its debt payments,97 but the late payment con-
stituted a credit event and triggered CDS payments to protection
buyers, such as GSO Capital. The resulting payments to CDS protec-
tion buyers totaled $197 million.98
2. Hovnanian
The Codere transaction was only the beginning of GSO’s engi-
neered CDS transactions. GSO’s transaction with Hovnanian was
more sophisticated and stirred up more controversy in the markets. In
2017, GSO purchased $330 million worth of credit protection on
Hovnanian, a U.S. residential real estate construction company.99
Hovnanian had experienced financial difficulties because of the 2008
housing crisis, but, unlike Codere, the company was not facing immi-
nent bankruptcy.100 Indeed, although Hovnanian’s bonds were junk
rated, they were trading close to or at face value, thereby indicating
no market panic over the company’s financial situation.101 GSO
96 Id. (“GSO and Canyon Partners LLC then took over what the company said at the
time was 100-million-euro revolving loan . . . .”); A Bondholder Finds a Sneaky Way to
Trigger Insurance Against Default, ECONOMIST (May 3, 2018), https://www.economist.com/
finance-and-economics/2018/05/03/a-bondholder-finds-a-sneaky-way-to-trigger-insurance-
against-default (highlighting the favorable terms of the loan, stating that Codere received a
“cheap $100m loan”). Notably, GSO was also a creditor of Codere but held “basis play[]”
CDS, which paid more in the event of default than if the debt was held to maturity. Thus,
despite being a creditor of Codere, GSO stood to gain more in the event of default. Dan
Primack, Blackstone Responds to Jon Stewart, FORTUNE (Dec. 6, 2013), http://fortune.com/
2013/12/05/blackstone-responds-to-jon-stewart.
97 Payments made after a thirty-day grace period are considered a credit event under
the ISDA Master Agreement, so the ISDA Determinations Committee officially declared
Codere’s thirty-two-day late payment qualified as a credit event. See ISDA, 2014 ISDA
Credit Derivatives Definitions, supra note 91.
98 Ruhle et al., supra note 95 (“[T]he International Swaps & Derivatives Association
ruled that there was a failure-to-pay credit event, resulting in a $197 million payment to
holders of the swaps.”).
99 Rennison, supra note 4 (stating that GSO accumulated $330 million in credit on
Hovnanian).
100 See Scurria, supra note 2 (noting that at the time GSO offered Hovnanian a very
attractive financing package, Hovnanian was not in severe financial distress and had the
funds to pay its debts).
101 Matt Levine, Blackstone May Do Its Cleverest CDS Trade Again, BLOOMBERG
OPINION (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-11-17/
blackstone-may-do-its-cleverest-cds-trade-again (explaining that almost all Hovnanian’s
bonds were trading around par value, indicating no signs of “panic level[],” but had low-
junk ratings).
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offered Hovnanian a loan on terms much more favorable than the
company could have received from another lender in its current finan-
cial condition.102 And, as with Codere, the loan required that
Hovnanian miss a specified upcoming debt payment.103 However, the
GSO-Hovnanian transaction faced two potential obstacles because,
although heavily indebted, Hovnanian was not financially distressed.
First, a default would negatively impact Hovnanian’s market reputa-
tion and credit rating, likely increasing the firm’s future borrowing
costs significantly.104 Second, with Hovnanian’s bonds trading only
slightly below par, GSO’s CDS payout would be minimal because of
the cheapest-to-deliver rule.105
To address these stumbling blocks, GSO included two material
conditions in its Hovnanian deal. First, as part of the financing,
Hovnanian’s subsidiary bought Hovnanian bonds and Hovnanian
defaulted only on the bonds held by its subsidiary, while making pay-
ments in full to all other bondholders.106 The default to the subsidiary
would nonetheless constitute a credit event under the Master
Agreement, but since it would not affect third-party bondholders, it
was not expected to significantly harm Hovnanian’s reputation in the
markets. Second, the GSO financing included a twenty-two-year bond
with a five percent interest payment.107 Given that these terms were
much better than Hovnanian’s financial situation warranted, the
bonds traded on the open market at less than half of their face
102 See Sridhar Natarajan, GSO Beats Rival Funds to Hovnanian Deal in Credit Swaps
Showdown, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 28, 2017, 4:38 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-12-28/hovnanian-sides-with-gso-in-hedge-fund-tiff-that-roiled-its-cds
(explaining that Hovnanian’s management and board reviewed several offers by financial
firms to refinance their existing debt, but the company decided to accept GSO’s offer due
to its favorable terms).
103 See Rennison, supra note 4.
104 See Sudip Datta, Mai Iskandar-Datta & Ajay Patel, Bank Monitoring and the Pricing
of Corporate Debt, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 435, 437, 441 (1999) (explaining that the firm’s
“reputation is a valuable asset,” which helps firms to borrow for less cost, and that “the
yield spread for corporate debt is negatively related to the bond’s rating”).
105 See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also
Levine, supra note 101 (explaining that Hovnanian’s bonds were trading 92 and 108 cents
on the dollar, therefore not leaving “much room to make money” by defaulting on its debt
obligations).
106 Childs, supra note 2 (explaining that the deal between GSO and Hovnanian would
not harm any real bondholder since Hovnanian’s subsidiary was to buy bonds with its own
money and then Hovnanian would default on those bonds).
107 Mary Childs, Solus Made Money from that CDS Litigation, BARRON’S (June 20,
2018, 1:03 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/solus-made-money-from-that-cds-
litigation-1529514208 (“In the exchange offer . . . bond holders could tender for cash, for
new notes yielding 13.5% and due in 2026, or for 5% senior secured notes due in 2040.”).
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value;108 as the lowest-priced bonds, these bonds would be used to
determine CDS payouts if there was a credit event, per the cheapest-
to-deliver rule.109 Thus, GSO ensured not only that its CDS would pay
off, but it also ensured that its payoff would be substantial—all
without violating the terms of the Master Agreement. Ultimately,
GSO abandoned the transaction because of tremendous regulatory
pressure.110 However, despite being abandoned, the GSO-Hovnanian
transactions demonstrate the extent to which savvy players can engi-
neer CDS transactions to the detriment of the markets and market
participants, thereby undermining the efficiency and integrity of the
CDS markets.
B. Avoiding Default: The Case of RadioShack
The traditional academic concern with respect to the distortion of
CDS outcomes is the “empty creditor problem”—that is, the concern
that CDS counterparties, specifically protection buyers, will force an
issuer into bankruptcy to profit on their CDS positions.111 However, a
CDS counterparty may engage in the reverse scheme: collaborating
with the issuer to temporarily avoid default. A CDS protection seller
can guarantee its preferred outcome by collaborating with the issuer
to avoid an impending default until the credit protection it sold has
expired.
Avoiding default works best with a financially distressed issuer
because of the high price the counterparty can demand for insuring
against the issuer’s default, which increases the profitability of the
transaction. To the extent the issuer remains solvent during the term
of the contract, the protection seller profits on the premiums collected
for guaranteeing the issuer’s debts. However, if the issuer defaults, the
protection seller faces potentially significant liabilities, which may not
be adequately covered by the premiums it received. Thus, to avoid its
obligations, the protection seller may extend a loan to the issuer to
108 See id. (“[T]he 5% notes due in 2040 have, by design, fallen since the exchange, to
about 45 cents on the dollar . . . .”). Such terms would be remarkable even for the most
financially stable firm, let alone Hovnanian that had a junk rating.
109 See Levine, supra note 101 (discussing how the cheapest-to-deliver rule plays out in a
CDS auction).
110 In its first public statement on engineered CDS transactions, the CFTC opined that it
viewed “[m]anufactured credit events” as market manipulation under the CEA. The
Commission, however, did not explain the basis for its opinion. CFTC Press Release, supra
note 12.
111 Bolton & Oehmke, supra note 43, at 2617. Bolton and Oehmke argue that CDS
“alter[ ] the debtor-creditor relation . . . as it partially or fully separates the creditor’s
control rights from his cash-flow rights.” Id. This separation has raised concerns regarding
empty creditors “push[ing] the debtor into inefficient bankruptcy or liquidation.” Id. For a
more in-depth discussion of the empty creditor problem, see supra Section I.A.
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ensure it remains solvent for the duration of the protection seller’s
outstanding CDS contracts. Helping the issuer stay afloat can be prof-
itable (or financially beneficial) for the protection seller if the protec-
tion seller either (i) earned more in premiums than would be needed
to keep the issuer solvent, or (ii) faces greater potential liabilities from
the issuer’s default than would be covered by the premiums collected.
In either instance, the CDS seller is incentivized to assist the issuer to
avoid default, albeit temporarily, thereby guaranteeing the profit-
ability (or minimizing the losses) on its CDS position.
RadioShack Corp. (RadioShack) provides a salient example of
this engineering strategy. RadioShack filed for bankruptcy in
February 2015 after a sustained period of financial decline and rising
debt.112 The company’s insolvency was hardly surprising—the markets
discounted RadioShack debt by eighty percent113 and RadioShack’s
third quarter filings in 2014 indicated that the company had approxi-
mately $60 million of liquidity versus over $800 million in debt.114
What was surprising was the timing of RadioShack’s bankruptcy,
which some allege was orchestrated to favor major CDS protection
sellers.115 Beginning in 2013, RadioShack launched an aggressive turn-
112 See Chris Isidore & Katie Lobosco, RadioShack Declares Bankruptcy, CNN BUS.
(Feb. 5, 2015, 8:39 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/02/05/news/companies/radioshack-
bankruptcy (“It’s been a long, slow decline for RadioShack. Losses have been mounting,
and in its latest quarter sales plunged 16% from a year ago. Cash-strapped, RadioShack
found itself saddled with more than 5,000 stores at the beginning of last year, many of
which it couldn’t afford to keep open.”). This was the first of RadioShack’s bankruptcies;
the second occurred in 2017 and is not relevant here. See Mike Snider, RadioShack Closing
187 Stores in Latest Bankruptcy Filing, USA TODAY (Mar. 9, 2017, 11:55 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2017/03/09/radioshack-files-bankruptcy-second-
time/98943636 (reporting on RadioShack’s 2017 bankruptcy filing).
113 RadioShack debt was trading at twenty cents on the dollar; for example, $10 million
of debt was worth $2 million. See Stephen B. Selbst, RadioShack Dissected: The Decline,
Fall and Possible Rebirth, ABFJOURNAL (Mar. 2016), https://www.abfjournal.com/
%3Fpost_type%3Darticles%26p%3D45905 (“RadioShack could have sold its assets and
liquidated in early 2014, which would have yielded a payout to unsecured creditors of
approximately 20 cents on the dollar.”); see also Rachelle Kakouris, Distressed Debt:
RadioShack, Salus Capital Spar over Alleged Leveraged Loan Covenant Breach, FORBES
(Dec. 2, 2014, 12:24 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2014/12/02/radioshack-
salus-capital-spar-over-alleged-leveraged-loan-covenant-breach (“[F]ive-year CDS . . . was
roughly 3% wider this morning, at 65.5/68 points upfront . . . . That’s a highly distressed
context for the contracts and represents about a $200,000 extra upfront payment, at
approximately $6.7 million at the midpoint, in addition to the $500,000 annual payment, to
protect $10 million of RadioShack bonds.”).
114 Kakouris, supra note 113.
115 See Peg Brickley, Creditors Ask for Probe into Missed Chances to Save RadioShack,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/creditors-ask-for-probe-into-
missed-chances-to-save-radioshack-1424211428 (describing how unsecured bondholders
sought a probe into whether RadioShack declared bankruptcy for the benefit of top-
ranking lenders).
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around effort that increased its debt-load but did little to stymie its
decline.116 Market observers expected the company to declare bank-
ruptcy in late 2014, ahead of the holiday shopping season; the CDS
market reflected these expectations as protection on RadioShack debt
in late 2014 traded significantly below par.117 Indeed, RadioShack was
all but locked out of the credit markets—lenders and investors saw
the proverbial writing on the wall and were unwilling to extend addi-
tional credit to the distressed company.118
Yet, there was another consideration at play—namely, the
upcoming December 20, 2014 expiration on RadioShack-referenced
CDS.119 Credit protection on RadioShack’s indebtedness was quite
expensive, thereby allowing CDS protection sellers to charge substan-
tial premiums, which they would only be able to keep if RadioShack
did not default.120 In October 2014, RadioShack’s primary creditor,
Standard General, led a consortium of hedge funds to extend a last-
minute lifeline in the form of a $120 million loan.121 Although uncon-
firmed, it has been strongly suggested that the hedge funds partici-
pating in the last-minute loan to RadioShack were protection sellers
of RadioShack CDS.122 On the one hand, a favorable view of the loan
is that it granted RadioShack another opportunity to turn its fortunes
around. On the other hand, a cynical view is that it was a short-term
loan that did not represent an investment in the future of the com-
pany; rather, it was a ploy to delay the company’s inevitable bank-
ruptcy for the benefit of CDS protection sellers.
116 See Jonathan Schwarzberg, RadioShack Lines Up $285 Million in Bankruptcy
Financing, REUTERS (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-radioshack-dip-
idUSKBN0LA1TB20150206 (explaining that in December 2013, RadioShack acquired
$835 million in debt from various creditors; however, it had to file for Chapter 11
bankruptcy in February 2015).
117 See Kakouris, supra note 113.
118 Selbst, supra note 113 (“Few investors or lenders in the retail industry could have
been surprised when RadioShack sought Chapter 11 protection in February 2015. . . . The
combination of reduced vendor credit and liquidity and declining sales led RadioShack to
file for Chapter 11 on February 5, 2015.”).
119 Kakouris, supra note 113.
120 Id.
121 Mike Kentz, CDS Allegations Surround RadioShack, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2014, 9:25
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/radioshack-cds/cds-allegations-surround-radioshack-
idUSL1N0TZ0V720141215.
122 See In re RadioShack Corp., No. 15-10197, ¶ 24 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015); see also
Brickley, supra note 115 (“[T]hey say[ ] hedge funds engineered a bankruptcy crash
landing designed to favor RadioShack’s US:RSHCQ top-ranking lenders . . . .”); Tom Hals,
Creditors Say RadioShack Timed Ch. 11 for Hedge Fund Trade: Filing, REUTERS (Feb. 18,
2015, 12:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-radioshack-bankruptcy-creditors-
idUSKBN0LM1PI20150218 (“Unsecured creditors of RadioShack Corp said the
electronics retailer timed its bankruptcy to benefit a hedge fund trading strategy. . . .”).
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Some CDS market participants shared the latter viewpoint and
anonymously petitioned the ISDA Determinations Committee to
decide whether the loan constituted a credit event under the ISDA
Master Agreement.123 They argued that RadioShack’s CDS would
have been triggered but for the last-minute loan. The petition claimed
that the loan was “structured with a purpose to manipulate the CDS
market” and, therefore, it ought to be disregarded and a credit event
declared.124 The Determinations Committee, however, disagreed,
finding that a credit event had not occurred,125 thereby guaranteeing
that payments on RadioShack CDS of over $500 million outstanding
notional would not be triggered.126 Unsurprisingly (at least to the
markets), RadioShack declared bankruptcy in February 2015—two
months after the expiration of CDS contracts held by RadioShack’s
last-minute lenders.
C. Negating Default: The Case of McClatchy
The final strategy that CDS investors may use to engineer CDS
outcomes is to negate future possible defaults by “orphaning” the
CDS. Here, a CDS protection seller offers financing to the issuer to
restructure its debts. The debt restructuring, however, moves the
debts off the balance sheets of the issuer and onto the balance sheets
of a subsidiary or an affiliate. The result of the restructuring is to elim-
inate the future possibility of issuer default, as the issuer no longer has
any outstanding debts. Thus, a CDS protection seller is guaranteed to
keep the profits made on selling protection because the issuer’s debt
has been eliminated. Additionally, the CDS protection seller is enti-
tled to continue collecting CDS premiums for the duration of the con-
tract, despite there being no possibility of default in the future. By
orphaning the CDS contract, the CDS protection seller guarantees
that it will not be required to make CDS payments to its counterpar-
ties by negating potential defaults under the CDS contract. As with
the prior strategies, this scheme works well with financially distressed
123 CREDIT DERIVATIVES DETERMINATIONS COMMS., QUESTION PRESENTED (Apr. 1,
2014), https://www.cdsdeterminationscommittees.org/documents/2014/12/20140401_
question-presented-v2.pdf; see also Rachelle Kakouris, ISDA Asked if RadioShack
Triggered Credit Default Swaps via Lender Notice of Default, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2014, 10:46
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2014/12/05/isda-asked-if-radioshack-
triggered-credit-default-swaps-via-lender-notice-of-default.
124 CREDIT DERIVATIVES DETERMINATIONS COMMS., supra note 123; see also Phil
Wahba, RadioShack Pulls the Plug and Files for Bankruptcy, FORTUNE (Feb. 5, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/02/05/radioshack-bankruptcy-filing (stating that Standard General
led a “rescue loan” for RadioShack).
125 CREDIT DERIVATIVES DETERMINATIONS COMMS., supra note 123.
126 Kentz, supra note 121.
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companies because (i) the high premiums demanded for credit protec-
tion for such entities increase the profitability of selling protection,
and (ii) the company is likely willing to undertake such a scheme
given its limited access to the credit markets.
An example of negating default involves the McClatchy
Company (McClatchy). McClatchy is a highly indebted newspaper
and online publishing company that experienced continued losses for
over five years.127 In the first quarter of 2018, McClatchy entered into
an agreement with Chatham Asset Management (Chatham) to refi-
nance most of its outstanding $710 million debt.128 The refinancing
agreement allowed McClatchy to reduce its debt load by approxi-
mately $50 million and extend its loan maturity by two to seven
years.129 However, the refinancing agreement had an important condi-
tion: A subsidiary of McClatchy would incur the debt for the refi-
nancing and use the proceeds to purchase McClatchy’s outstanding
bonds. The refinancing meant that McClatchy would no longer have
any outstanding debt; all of McClatchy’s debt would be transferred to
its subsidiary.130 Importantly, the subsidiary’s debt was not covered
under outstanding CDS contracts on McClatchy.
McClatchy’s proposed refinancing concerned its CDS protection
buyers, namely because it meant that they would hold orphaned CDS
but would still be required to make premium payments on the CDS
contracts.131 With McClatchy being a mostly debt-free entity, the like-
lihood of default for the ailing company was considerably reduced,
making CDS protection purchased on McClatchy technically worth-
127 Ken Doctor, Gannett, McClatchy Close Out a Dismal Year, POLITICO (Feb. 9, 2017,
2:31 PM), https://www.politico.com/media/story/2017/02/gannett-mcclatchy-close-out-a-
dismal-year-004930 (noting that, in 2017, McClatchy reported a revenue loss of 7.5% and a
print ad loss of 20.6% for the fourth quarter).
128 McClatchy Reports Second Quarter 2018 Results, MCCLATCHY (July 27, 2018), http://
investors.mcclatchy.com/news-releases/news-release-details/mcclatchy-reports-second-
quarter-2018-results (stating that McClatchy reported an adjusted net loss of $5.6 million in
the second quarter of 2018, and in July 2018 entered into a two-tranche Junior Lien Term
Loan Agreement with Chatham Asset Management for $157.1 million and $193.5 million,
respectively).
129 McClatchy had three loans outstanding, due in 2022, 2027, and 2029. The refinancing
agreement extended the maturity on McClatchy’s debt to 2030 and 2031. The McClatchy
Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1056087/000114420418023038/tv492361_8k.htm.
130 Claire Boston & Sridhar Natarajan, McClatchy Hands Win to CDS Buyers as It
Tweaks Debt Deal, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2018, 11:11 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-06-27/mcclatchy-hands-win-to-cds-buyers-as-it-tweaks-refinancing-deal.
131 Levine, supra note 12 (explaining that the deal between McClatchy and Chatham
was “bad news for the hedge funds, banks and other investors that had bought insurance
against a McClatchy default,” as McClatchy had effectively no significant debt).
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less.132 Unsurprisingly, Chatham was a major seller of McClatchy’s
CDS protection and, thus, stood to gain considerably from the trans-
action in two ways. The refinancing agreement meant that the CDS
protection it sold on McClatchy could not be triggered, since
McClatchy no longer had any debt.133 It also meant that Chatham
could continue to collect CDS premiums for the life of the CDS con-
tract, despite the elimination of McClatchy’s indebtedness.134 By
negating McClatchy’s future default, Chatham guaranteed the profit-
ability of its CDS positions and did so at the expense of its
counterparties.
III
ASSESSING BENEFITS, COSTS, AND THE MARKET’S
RESPONSES
The market response to engineered CDS transactions has been
mixed. Whereas some view engineered CDS as a useful innovation in
the credit markets that have opened new financing pathways for dis-
tressed companies,135 others view the transactions as an exploitation
of CDS that may constitute market manipulation.136 Implicit in discus-
sions of the virtues and vices of engineered CDS is also an assessment
of whether legal intervention is necessary or desirable to curtail these
transactions. However, these are two separate albeit related questions.
That is to say, identification of the externalities that accompany engi-
neered CDS transactions is analytically distinct from determining
whether these associated externalities justify legal involvement in the
CDS markets. Yet, because the two issues are closely related, prior to
132 See Sridhar Natarajan, Anchorage Caught Short in Chatham’s McClatchy Trade,
BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2018, 11:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-
02/anchorage-said-to-be-caught-short-in-chatham-s-mcclatchy-trade (highlighting that to
the extent that the deal works out, “anyone who bought insurance on a McClatchy default
would effectively be paying insurance on an entity with no significant debt” and that swaps
would be “all but worthless”).
133 See Levine, supra note 12 (detailing McClatchy’s refinancing transaction which made
defaults impossible).
134 Id. (“Chatham’s CDS—which it sold at high prices reflecting McClatchy’s low-junk
Caa1/CCC+ credit ratings—will turn out to be free money.”).
135 Fanni Koszeg, The Evolution of Credit Default Swaps and Efforts to Regulate Them:
What Will Be the Impact of JP Morgan Chase’s Recent $2 Billion Trading Loss,
BLOOMBERG (July 16, 2012), https://www.bna.com/evolution-credit-default-n12884910685
(noting that in 2002, Federal Reserve Board Vice-Chair Roger Ferguson stated that CDS
“enhance economic efficiency” and “contribute to financial stability”).
136 See Kadhim Shubber, CFTC: Deliberate Defaults May Be ‘Market Manipulation,’
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/2f7f2b68-480e-11e8-8ee8-
cae73aab7ccb. In response to Hovnanian’s attempt to default as part of its debt refinancing
plan with GSO, the CFTC stated that “[m]anufactured credit events may constitute market
manipulation and may severely damage the integrity of the CDS markets.” Id.
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addressing the latter issue, one must first assess the former,
accounting for the positive and negative externalities that arise from
engineered CDS transactions.
Part III analyzes the ex post and ex ante consequences of engi-
neered CDS transactions to determine whether their costs outweigh
their benefits. This Part considers whether parties to engineered CDS
internalize costs arising from these transactions and to what extent
these costs are externalized to third parties. The analysis of the effects
on parties considers the costs of engineered CDS on the CDS
counterparty that engineers the transaction (the “winning”
counterparty), the counterparty that loses in the transaction (the
“losing” counterparty), and the issuer that receives favorable
financing. In assessing the effects on third parties, Part III considers
the broader ramifications of engineered transactions for other market
participants who are not involved in engineered transactions. As ana-
lyzed in greater detail below, engineered transactions are net positive
for issuers but, at best, are zero-sum for CDS counterparties. For non-
parties, engineered CDS impose negative externalities, from both an
ex post and an ex ante perspective, which are not offset by any bene-
fits to the markets. Thus, in light of the negative externalities arising
from engineered transactions, there is a strong justification for regula-
tory intervention in the market, despite the sophistication of the par-
ties and the bilateral, contractual nature of their transactions.
Notwithstanding the associated negative externalities, to the
extent the market can punish parties to engineered CDS transactions,
forcing them to internalize the costs of these transactions, then legal
intervention would not be needed. Part III assesses whether and to
what extent market discipline can minimize the negative externalities
engineered CDS produce. However, as discussed in Section III.C,
market discipline is ineffective in the CDS market because of informa-
tion asymmetry and high transaction costs, which renders market dis-
cipline impotent against engineered CDS transactions.
A. The Consequences for the Parties
To determine the effects of engineered transactions on the par-
ties, it is necessary to consider their consequences, which allows for an
assessment of their relative costs and benefits. Indeed, there is limited
justification for legal intervention if engineered CDS impose costs that
are either outweighed by their benefits or are internalized by CDS
counterparties and the issuer, thereby resulting in a net neutral or net
positive transaction. This Section first assesses the consequences of
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engineered transactions on the participating issuer and next, on the
CDS counterparties.
The Participating Issuer. A positive view of engineered CDS is
that it is a source of alternative financing for distressed issuers. An
issuer facing financial distress must pay high interest rates to compen-
sate creditors for the high risk of default.137 With engineered CDS, a
financially distressed issuer can monetize its potential default or non-
default by collaborating with the CDS counterparty that values it
most, thereby transforming its distress into needed funding. For the
issuer, there are no costs for which to account ex ante, particularly
because it is not a party to the CDS contract. Ex post, however, engi-
neered transactions impose costs on the issuer, including increased
future funding costs because of reputational harm from engaging in an
engineered transaction and potential negative effects on its non-CDS
constituencies.138 Arguably, the issuer should have balanced the bene-
fits of additional financing it would receive against costs of the trans-
action, including harm of the transaction to its reputation; legal costs
that may stem from the transaction; and future funding costs, as part
of its decision whether to participate in an engineered transaction.
Assuming that the issuer has properly accounted for such costs and
has built these costs into its decision on whether to assist a CDS
counterparty in engineering, engineered transactions are (or at least
should be) net positive for a participating issuer.
CDS Counterparties. For the CDS counterparties, however, the
calculus is different. The profits to the winning counterparty, on the
one hand, and the losses to the losing counterparty, on the other hand,
equal a zero-sum transaction between the CDS counterparties.139 Spe-
cifically, the benefits of an engineered CDS to both the issuer, in the
form of better financing, and the winning CDS counterparty, in the
form of a contract payoff, are entirely offset by costs to the losing
CDS counterparty. Thus, as between CDS counterparties, engineered
CDS transactions—similar to non-engineered CDS—do not create
137 See Jorge A. Chan-Lau & Yoon Sook Kim, Equity Prices, Credit Default Swaps, and
Bond Spreads in Emerging Markets 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/04/27,
2004), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp0427.pdf.
138 See infra Section III.B for a discussion of costs to non-parties to the CDS markets,
such as shareholders and creditors of the issuer. It is unlikely that the issuer will account
for these third-party costs in deciding whether to participate in an engineered transaction
because the issuer does not bear these costs. As such, these third-party costs are not
included in the analysis here.
139 A zero-sum game is one in which one party’s gain stems directly from the losses of
the other party; both parties cannot win. See Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P.
Summers, When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities
Transactions Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 261, 272 (1989) (recognizing that trading is a zero-
sum game).
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value. Rather, these transactions take wealth from one party and
redistribute it to the other parties.140
However, closer analysis reveals that the ex post consequences of
engineered CDS are not truly neutral, despite being zero-sum transac-
tions. Counterparties to engineered transactions, especially the win-
ning counterparty, incur “engineering” costs in executing the
transaction.141 The engineering costs are twofold. First, there are the
costs arising from arranging and executing the engineered transaction
with the relevant issuer. These include research, negotiation, and gen-
eral transaction costs associated with accomplishing the transaction.
Additionally, to the extent CDS counterparties try to outbid each
other for the issuer’s default or non-default, the associated transaction
costs are further increased. Second, there are the ex post information
costs that CDS traders may incur to minimize the likelihood that they
are the losers in an engineered CDS transaction. Faced with the likeli-
hood that their counterparties may engineer their preferred outcome,
CDS traders may incur significant information and research costs to
determine whether their counterparties are incentivized to behave
opportunistically.142 Thus, an ex post cost of engineered CDS is
greater information costs, for both counterparties, as they attempt to
reduce the information asymmetry of the CDS transaction, thereby
decreasing the risk of moral hazard.143 Arguably, the winning
counterparty should have accounted for engineering costs in balancing
the costs of engaging in an engineered CDS and the potential payout
140 See Lynn A. Stout, Betting the Bank: How Derivatives Trading Under Conditions of
Uncertainty Can Increase Risks and Erode Returns in Financial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L. 53,
60 (1995) (“Speculative transactions of this sort would neither increase nor decrease the
average derivative trader’s wealth if dealing in derivatives were costless (although it might
redistribute that wealth a fair bit).”).
141 Even in the absence of engineered outcomes, CDS are zero-sum transactions that
can be negative-sum because of the transaction costs associated with the trade, such as fees
paid to swap dealers for facilitating the trade, premiums paid to protection sellers, and/or
margin used as collateral for the trade, among other costs. See, e.g., id. at 61 (discussing
that derivatives are innately zero-sum games which transform into negative-sum games
because of the associated transaction costs). These costs are not discussed because they are
not unique to engineered CDS transactions but accompany all CDS transactions.
142 See infra Section III.C for a discussion on why it may be nonetheless difficult for
counterparties to obtain this information even with diligent research.
143 Moral hazard arises when one party engages in high-risk conduct because they do
not bear the consequences of their conduct. As a quasi-form of insurance, moral hazard is
an innate risk associated with CDS. See Henderson, supra note 52, at 19 (stating that a
similarity between credit derivatives and insurance is the presence of moral hazard). While
the traditional concern with CDS is the moral hazard the protection buyer faces, via the
empty creditor problem, engineered CDS transactions demonstrate that the risk of
strategic behavior is symmetric and either the protection buyer or seller may engage in
engineered CDS transactions. See supra Part II for a discussion of engineered transactions
initiated by either the protection buyer or seller.
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it would receive. The losing counterparty, on the other hand, may
have underpriced the risk of engineering and, as such, may face higher
than expected costs if the CDS is later engineered. But, given that
either side may decide that it is worthwhile to engineer, both
counterparties can account for engineering costs in deciding, in the
first instance, whether to enter into a CDS transaction at all and, in
the second instance, whether to attempt to avoid, manufacture, or
negate the CDS’s default.
In sum, if CDS counterparties account for engineering costs at
the time of transacting, the ex post costs for either counterparty ought
to be zero-sum, even if one party later decides to engineer the out-
come of the CDS. CDS counterparties are sophisticated enough that
each can balance the costs of winning and losing in an engineered
CDS transaction and price the risk into the trade. Indeed, given that
these are sophisticated actors, this conclusion is not surprising—in
knowing that their counterparty may engineer, CDS traders can
account for such risk in the price they demand for buying or selling
protection.144 Thus, from the standpoint of the CDS counterparties, it
is ambiguous as to whether legal intervention is necessary to protect
them from engineered CDS transactions.
B. The Consequences for Third Parties
While CDS counterparties and issuers may balance the effects
and price the costs of engineered CDS to themselves into their trans-
actions, they cannot and do not account for how engineered transac-
tions harm third parties. As evidenced by the 2008 crisis, CDS have
far reaching repercussions on the broader financial markets, extending
beyond counterparties and the CDS markets.145 Engineered CDS
transactions are no different—the ex post and ex ante consequences
of these transactions impact the CDS markets, CDS traders not party
to engineered transactions, and non-CDS traders. The ex post and ex
ante consequences of engineered CDS transactions are discussed
respectively below.
1. Ex Post Effects
The nature of the CDS markets may cause one to consider engi-
neered transactions to be the cost of doing business. As some have
asserted and as the analysis of the ex post consequences for CDS
144 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 93 (stating that the only losers in engineered CDS
transactions “were presumably sophisticated, well-informed traders at big banks”).
145 See, e.g., Scott E. Harrington, The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, and the Future of
Insurance Regulation, 76 J. RISK & INS. 785, 787 (2009) (explaining the rise in CDS and
their effect on the mortgage market, which eventually led to the financial crisis).
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counterparties confirms, losing counterparties in engineered CDS
transactions are large, sophisticated parties that can account for the
costs of these machinations.146 However, the effect of the engineered
CDS transactions extends beyond large CDS traders and has a
broader impact on the CDS market, other CDS traders, and, notably,
non-CDS traders. There are two noteworthy ex post third-party exter-
nalities that arise from engineered CDS: (i) costs to the CDS markets
because of the burden that engineered transactions put on the
market’s price discovery mechanisms, and (ii) costs to non-CDS par-
ties connected to the issuer, such as creditors and shareholders.
a. Pricing Inefficiency in the CDS Market
Pricing CDS is a complex undertaking that requires econometric
calculations that are beyond the scope of this Article.147 Nonetheless,
from a high level of abstraction, the price of a CDS reflects the likeli-
hood of default of the referenced issuer.148 To price this risk, investors
and the market consider three broad factors: (i) the current economic
well-being of the issuer and its future plans for growth; (ii) the pros-
pects of the issuer’s industry; and (iii) the macro-economic trends,
forecast, and risk factors of the issuer’s geographic market.149 The
market assesses each factor and, on the basis of known information
and market expectations, it establishes a “spread” (i.e., price) to
reflect the referenced issuer’s default risk.150 A high(er) spread indi-
cates a high(er) expected risk of default, whereas a low(er) spread
indicates the converse.151 As the price of the CDS changes, the spread
146 Levine, supra note 93.
147 See, e.g., Yuan Wen & Jacob Kinsella, Credit Default Swap — Pricing Theory, Real
Data Analysis and Classroom Applications Using Bloomberg Terminal 6–7 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the New York University Law Review), https://data.
bloomberglp.com/bat/sites/3/2016/10/WhitePaper_Wen.pdf.
148 See PRACTICAL LAW FIN. ET AL., supra note 89 (“Pricing of a CDS contract reflects:
[t]he probability that a failure to pay will occur with respect to the reference entity, and
[t]he likely value of the CDS contract in the event a failure to pay does occur.”).
149 CDS Spreads and the Impact of Spread Widening , FIN. TRAIN, https://
financetrain.com/cds-spreads-and-impact-spread-widening (last visited Aug. 20, 2018)
(stating that there are multiple factors apart from CDS spread that determine the credit
risk of an entity, including “worsening macroeconomic conditions . . . the equity market’s
implied volatility, industry, leverage of the reference entity, the risk-free rate, and liquidity
of the CDS contract”).
150 See Hao Wang, Hao Zhou & Yi Zhou, Credit Default Swap Spreads and Variance
Risk Premia, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3733, 3736 (2013) (explaining that the periodic
payment that a protection buyer makes to the seller, as a percentage of the notional value
of a bond is the CDS spread, which “[b]y definition . . . provides a pure measure of the
default risk of the reference entity”).
151 See JODY LURIE, JANNEY INV. STRATEGY GRP., CLASH OF THE TIGHTENS: HISTORY
OF CREDIT SPREADS 1, 2 (2018), https://www.janney.com/File%20Library/Unassigned/
History-of-Credit-Spreads-2018-01-12.pdf (presenting a graph spanning eighteen years that
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changes in response to both the supply and demand for the contract
and relevant information that impacts the market’s assessment of the
issuer’s credit risk.152 Therefore, the price of the CDS reflects the like-
lihood of the issuer’s default as a result of its financial condition.153
Engineered CDS diminish the pricing efficiency of the markets by
distorting the reliability of the CDS spread as a reflection of the
issuer’s risk of default arising from its financial condition.154 By
divorcing default risk from the financial condition of the issuer, engi-
neered CDS hamper price discovery and decrease the value of CDS
prices as a source of information on the issuer. The consequences on
the pricing efficiency of the CDS market are twofold, yet highly
interrelated.
First, engineered CDS transactions reduce the value of the CDS
spread as an indicator of the issuer’s financial condition. In the
absence of engineered transactions, CDS prices represent the
market’s estimation of the issuer’s credit risk given its financial condi-
tion.155 Engineered transactions untether default risk from the issuer’s
financial condition and, consequently, there is a significant increase
(decrease) of the CDS spread, despite there being no fundamental
change to the issuer’s financial condition. In each of the examples dis-
cussed above, the CDS prices of issuers participating in engineered
transactions experienced sharp swings following the announcement of
an engineered transaction, thereby diminishing the informational
value of the CDS price to the markets. Engineered CDS make the
spread a noisier, and therefore less useful, signal of the creditworthi-
ness of the issuer because the spread is no longer representative of the
issuer’s financial condition.
Consider that an issuer may be a high credit risk because of its
debt load or other economic factors, but the market did not consider it
to be at a high risk of defaulting on its outstanding obligations. This
documents defaulting events, such as the Lehman Brothers’ collapse and AIG’s bailout,
which correspond to credit spread widening); Simon Constable, Why Tighter Credit
Spreads Matter to Investors, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2014, 4:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/why-tighter-credit-spreads-matter-to-investors-1404679626 (stating that CDS
spreads have shrunk in recent years which means “there is less risk of companies failing to
pay the interest owed”).
152 Mark J. Flannery et al., Credit Default Swaps as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2088 (2010).
153 See PRACTICAL LAW FIN. ET AL., supra note 89.
154 Prices are efficient when they quickly and accurately reflect available information.
Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
DUKE L.J. 711, 721 (2006) (“In efficient markets, information about the value of firms is
incorporated quickly and accurately into stock prices.”).
155 See, e.g., Colm Doherty, CDS as a Measure of Credit Risk, RISK.NET (Sept. 14, 2009),
https://www.risk.net/derivatives/credit-derivatives/1533384/cds-measure-credit-risk.
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was evident with Hovnanian’s CDS. In the months preceding the
GSO–Hovnanian deal, Hovnanian’s CDS traded at approximately
1600 basis points156 and its S&P credit rating was CCC+, both of
which indicated that the company was financially vulnerable but not
expected to default on its obligations.157 After the GSO deal was
announced, however, the spread doubled to over 3200 basis points,158
and its credit rating was downgraded to CC, despite the fact that
Hovnanian’s creditworthiness had not changed. Thus, Hovnanian’s
credit spread was no longer an accurate reflection of its financial con-
dition, but instead reflected the market’s expectation of its negotiated
default. Engineered CDS transactions, therefore, distort the market’s
ability to provide an accurate portrayal of the financial condition of
the issuer in its CDS spread, thereby denying the markets of socially
beneficial information.
Second and relatedly, in the wake of, or in expectation of, an
engineered transaction, the CDS spread becomes a reflection of the
likelihood of engineering. With the default risk reflected in the CDS
spread being unmoored from the issuer’s financial condition, the CDS
price becomes instead a signal of the market’s assessment of the
probability of an engineered transaction being announced or, if
already announced, the probability of success of an engineered trans-
action resulting in default or non-default. Taken to its natural conclu-
sion, in a market in which engineered transactions are feasible and
permissible, the CDS spread of companies that could be targets of
engineered transactions will increasingly reflect the risk of
engineered-related outcomes,159 rather than the issuer’s fundamental
credit risk. This diminishes the market value of CDS prices and
impedes the price efficiency of the CDS market to the detriment of all
market participants.
156 See Boston & Natarajan, supra note 11 (showing Hovnanian’s CDS prices from May
2017 to May 2018). This meant that it cost, for example, $1600 to insure $100,000 of debt.
157 See Abdul Rehman Maqbool, S&P Downgrades Hovnanian Enterprises Rating, S&P
GLOBAL (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/
trending/uvtrro477wphieoqofhbma2 (indicating Hovnanian’s pre-GSO transaction credit
rating); S&P GLOBAL RATINGS, DEFINITIONS tbl.1 (2019), https://www.standardandpoors.
com/en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/sourceId/504352 (discussing what a CCC rating
means).
158 See Boston & Natarajan, supra note 11 (showing Hovnanian’s CDS prices from May
2017 to May 2018).
159 This refers to three things: (i) the likelihood of engineering occurring in the future;
(ii) the likelihood of success (failure) of the engineered transaction; and (iii) the likelihood
of default or non-default given the expected or proposed engineered transaction. In a
market with engineered transactions, all three of these considerations are likely to be
incorporated into the CDS spread as the market tries to anticipate the various facets of an
engineered transaction in the markets.
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For example, prior to the McClatchy transaction becoming
public, the company’s CDS traded on average at 900 basis points or
9% of the contract—meaning, it cost approximately $900,000 per year
to insure $10,000,000 of McClatchy’s debt.160 After the announce-
ment, the spread fell to almost 300 basis points, as the markets viewed
CDS protection on the company to be null given the expected
negating of the CDS contracts.161 The post-engineering price of
McClatchy’s CDS was not a result of any changes to McClatchy’s
financial condition. From a financial standpoint, the likelihood of
McClatchy’s default due to its financial condition had not changed.
Rather, the sharp decline in price was due to the market’s assessment
of McClatchy’s engineered-related default risk, which was much lower
than the company’s actual default risk, in light of the proposed engi-
neered transaction. The engineered transaction, therefore, caused the
CDS spread to reflect the probability of success of the announced
engineered transaction, rather than McClatchy’s true risk of default,
that is, the risk of default given its financial condition.
b. Costs to Non-CDS Traders
Another consequence of engineered CDS is the impact such
transactions have on non-CDS investors that are connected to the
issuer. Specifically, the issuer’s decision to participate in an engi-
neered CDS transaction impacts third parties, such as creditors, sup-
pliers, employees, and shareholders of the issuer. For example,
engineered CDS transactions aimed at avoiding default through
extension of a short-term loan harms the issuer’s other creditors, par-
ticularly its unsecured creditors. Indeed, this was the basis of the com-
plaint of RadioShack’s unsecured creditors, which included
employees, landlords, suppliers, and unsecured bondholders, after
RadioShack received a loan that allowed it to temporarily avoid
default.162 The company’s unsecured creditors sought to have the last-
minute loan excluded as a claim against RadioShack’s bankruptcy
estate on the grounds that the loan was extended primarily to control
the timing of RadioShack’s bankruptcy and to help CDS protection
sellers avoid significant losses.163 This type of last-minute extension of
credit does not represent a longer-term commitment to reviving the
160 Boston & Natarajan, supra note 130.
161 Id.
162 See Order Pursuant to Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rule
2004, and Local Bankruptcy Rule 2004-1, Authorizing and Directing the Examination of
the Debtors and Certain Third Parties, In re RadioShack Corp., Case No. 15-10197, 550
B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 12, 2015) (No. 304).
163 Id. at 23–25.
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company or helping it avoid bankruptcy. Rather, it increases the com-
pany’s indebtedness and must be accounted for in later, inevitable
bankruptcy proceedings.
For unsecured creditors of the issuer, engineered CDS transac-
tions negatively impact them in two related ways. First, since the loan
is short-term focused—usually intended to help the issuer make it
through two or three months—it does not trickle down to unsecured
creditors; they remain unpaid despite the last-minute financing.
Second, when the issuer later inevitably fails, the unsecured creditors’
claims are likely to be subordinated to the short-term loan, which may
be collateralized, thereby giving it priority over any unsecured
claims.164 The short-term loan, therefore, only further decreases the
likelihood that unsecured creditors will be paid at all from the bank-
ruptcy assets.
Engineered CDS are also costly to the participating issuer’s
shareholders. Although participating in engineered CDS provides
cheaper financing for financially distressed companies, involvement in
these transactions likely exposes the company to lawsuits that are an
added drain on corporate resources.165 For example, once Hovnanian
and GSO agreed on a manufactured default, Hovnanian was sued by
GSO’s CDS counterparty. Defending itself against the suit, including
motions, attorneys’ fees, and countless hours from executives, imposes
costs on Hovnanian’s shareholders in the form of lost managerial time
and likely decreased stock value. Indeed, the costs of potential legal
action, including fines and penalties, are further increased if a regu-
lator decides to investigate and bring an enforcement action against
the company for its participation in an engineered CDS transaction.
2. Ex Ante Effects
Engineered CDS have three ex ante consequences on the mar-
kets and market actors, which further increase the costs associated
with these transactions. Engineered CDS decrease CDS liquidity,
impair market integrity, and negatively impact the availability of
credit. Together, these consequences destroy the utility of CDS and
the CDS market, imposing additional unaccounted for costs on third
parties.
164 See David Gray Carlson, A Theory of Contractual Debt Subordination and Lien
Priority, 38 VAND. L. REV. 975, 991 (1985) (“[A] typical creditor should understand that
subordination pertains to bankruptcy priority, and that subordinated debt falls behind
other debt in that priority.”). See generally Dee M. Calligar, Subordination Agreements, 70
YALE L.J. 376 (1961).
165 See Boston & Natarajan, supra note 11 (describing a lawsuit brought by Solus
Alternative Asset Management against Blackstone GSO Capital Partners).
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a. Decreased Liquidity
Engineered CDS transactions decrease the liquidity of the CDS
market because traders are likely to withdraw from the markets owing
to the decreased utility of CDS as risk mitigation tools. As discussed
above, engineered CDS transactions undermine the pricing efficiency
of the CDS markets by distorting the market’s ability to accurately
price the risk of default. A key component of pricing efficiency is
market liquidity. Liquidity refers to the presence of other traders in
the markets with whom one may readily transact.166 Pricing efficiency
and liquidity have a symbiotic relationship—higher liquidity results in
greater pricing efficiency and vice versa.167
Given the effect of engineered CDS on pricing efficiency, it is
unsurprising that these transactions also negatively impact CDS
liquidity. With the pricing accuracy of CDS being impaired, market
participants are likely to withdraw from the CDS markets, diminishing
the liquidity of the CDS market.168 Engineered CDS do not provide
the insurance-like protection from default that make CDS valuable
risk mitigation instruments, and thus they are of limited value to CDS
counterparties who seek to use the instruments for hedging. Even for
speculators, the proliferation of engineered transactions makes CDS
an unwise investment. In the absence of engineering, CDS allow
traders to diversify risk exposure according to the risk appetites of
investors; engineering or the possibility thereof undermines the funda-
mental purpose of the instruments, transforming them almost entirely
into gambling instruments that can be gamed. A rational investor is
unlikely to invest in a CDS knowing that at any time her counterparty
may engineer an outcome to her detriment. Indeed, many large inves-
tors that are active participants in the CDS markets have made state-
ments to the press condemning these transactions and stating that it
decreases the attractiveness of CDS.169 Thus, from an ex ante point of
166 DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, MARKET LIQUIDITY: A PRIMER 3
(2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Market-Liquidity.pdf
(providing a comparison between two markets exhibiting that liquidity emerges from ease
of transactions based on time restraints, minimal transaction costs, and presence of
potential buyers willing to pay theoretical market value).
167 NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS, THE LOGIC OF SECURITIES LAW 144 (“Greater
trading activity translates to greater liquidity directly. . . . The economic force leading from
liquidity to accurate prices rests on the reality that liquidity attracts informed trading.”).
168 Childs, supra note 2 (“If users can’t foresee and price such risks, they may stop using
CDS altogether!”).
169 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 12 (quoting a managing director at XAIA Investment as
saying that “[t]he whole market is losing credibility when you have events like this where
you try to trigger the CDS or create orphaning situations”); Sridhar Natarajan, This Hedge
Fund Trade Is Stirring Fresh Controversy in the CDS Market, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2018,
11:12 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-30/hedge-fund-gambit-stirs-
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view, engineered CDS negatively affect the liquidity of the CDS mar-
kets as traders, including both hedgers and speculators, limit their par-
ticipation in the markets to avoid being on the losing end of an
engineered transaction.
b. Impaired Market Integrity
A noteworthy cost of engineered CDS is impairment of market
integrity. Market integrity is a broad term that encapsulates the con-
cept of market fairness, the absence of market abuse, and the protec-
tion of investors.170 It is an essential characteristic of a well-
functioning market, as investors are only likely to participate to the
extent they believe the markets are fair and are not stacked against
them.171 If, on the other hand, investors believe the markets to be
rigged, they are unlikely to enter the markets or, should they enter,
they will discount the value of all transactions.172 Market integrity,
therefore, is a bedrock component of the proper functioning of the
financial markets.173
Despite its importance, the concept of market integrity can be
somewhat amorphous, particularly in the CDS markets, where trading
is a zero-sum game.174 However, while traders understand that the
markets carry risk, which means their loss may be the result of
another’s gain, they do not expect those losses to be as a result of an
fresh-controversy-in-besieged-cds-market (quoting a money manager at Resource America
Inc. as saying that “CDS is being manipulated to the point that it potentially invalidates the
product . . . . Fundamentally, markets rely upon valid prices. How can I use a product if I
need to worry that counterparties are trying to vandalize capital structures to contort CDS
contracts?”).
170 Gina-Gail Fletcher, Legitimate yet Manipulative: The Conundrum of Open-Market
Manipulation, 68 DUKE L.J. 479, 492 (2018).
171 See Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of
the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1982) (“If the public believes that the
game is unfair and chooses not to play, the markets will suffer, and the efficient allocation
of capital will be impeded.”); Fletcher, supra note 170, at 489–90 (explaining that market
manipulation “impairs the market’s integrity because the conduct can lead other market
participants to believe the market is unfair”).
172 This is a classic lemons market as first described by George Akerlof: In a market in
which buyers do not know which cars are worth their asking price and those that are not
(i.e., lemons), the buyer will simply treat all cars like lemons. The result will be that worthy
car sellers will leave the markets, being unable to get an accurate price for their product
and lemon sellers will remain in the market. George A. Akerlof, The Market for
“Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 48 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90
(1970); see also Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Vulnerable Software: Product-Risk
Norms and the Problem of Unauthorized Access, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 45, 83
(2012).
173 See Akerlof, supra note 172, at 489–90 (illustrating how a violation of market
integrity can adversely affect the stock price of a publicly traded corporation).
174 See Stout, supra note 140, at 745 (“[S]peculation on disagreement is a zero-sum game
in which one player’s game is necessarily the other’s loss.”).
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unfair advantage. Thus, the concept of fairness cannot be overly broad
to extend to any or all losses suffered in the market; losses are to be
expected. Rather, to be a meaningful basis of analysis of market harm,
fairness must be framed as the absence of unjust wealth transfers. As I
explained in prior scholarship:
A transaction is unfair and harms the markets’ integrity if it allows
one trader to place her thumb on the scale such that the playing
field is no longer level. This view of fairness rests on the reasonable
expectations of the parties that their transactions have the same
likelihood of success or failure.175
When considered in this light, it is evident that engineered CDS
transactions are unfair, create the perception of the market being
rigged, and undermine the integrity of the market.176 In collaborating
with issuers to avoid, manufacture, or negate the issuer’s default, CDS
traders that engineer preferred outcomes undermine the reasonable
expectations of their counterparties.177 Fundamentally, parties enter
into CDS expecting that the ultimate determination of whether the
contract pays off rests with market forces, over which neither party
has control. However, when a counterparty interferes and skews the
outcome of the CDS contract to her benefit, she undercuts her
counterparties’ reasonable expectations and unjustly transfers wealth
from her counterparty to herself. As one CDS trader succinctly stated:
“It’s 100 percent fair to take the opposite side of a trade. . . . But if
then you do something bilaterally with the company, that isn’t a fair
trade.”178 Engineered CDS undermine the reasonable expectations of
the markets, reducing the public’s confidence and trust in the fairness
of the market.179 And, importantly, as engineered transactions prolif-
175 Fletcher, supra note 170, at 533.
176 Levine, supra note 12 (recognizing that the CDS market is losing its credibility and
its proper functioning); Matt Levine, RadioShack Is Running on Credit Derivatives,
BLOOMBERG OPINION (Dec. 18, 2014, 3:48 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2014-12-18/radioshack-is-running-on-credit-derivatives (“[I]t is a mistake to think
of derivatives as purely zero-sum, two-party bets with no implications for the underlying
thing. Those bets don’t want to stay in their boxes; they want to leak out and try to make
themselves come true.”); Scurria, supra note 2 (stating that the GSO-Hovnanian
transaction raised concerns about the vulnerability of the CDS market to manipulation and
“undermin[ed] the usefulness of credit default swaps as an insurance product”).
177 As the CFTC states: “The CDS market functions based on the premise that firms
referenced in CDS contracts seek to avoid defaults, and as a result, the instruments are
priced based on the financial health of the reference entity.” CFTC Press Release, supra
note 12. However, although the CFTC is only referring to manufactured defaults, the same
is true for all strategies used to engineer CDS outcomes.
178 Natarajan, supra note 169 (quoting XAIA Investment GmbH managing director
Jochen Felsenheimer).
179 As discussed in Section III.C, infra, while these may be the reasonable expectations
of CDS counterparties, they are explicitly disclaimed in the Master Agreement. That is to
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erate, it is likely that fewer investors will participate in the market,
reducing it to a classic lemons market. The diminished integrity of the
CDS market is a significant and costly consequence of engineered
CDS and, if engineered transactions are allowed to thrive, they
threaten the survival of the CDS market.
c. Reduced Credit Market Liquidity
A prime benefit of CDS is that they allow investors to offset and
manage their risk exposure, thereby enhancing the liquidity of the
bond market. With CDS, bondholders are able to lower their credit
risk, which in turn increases their willingness to extend more credit to
other borrowers.180 By facilitating the transfer of long-term credit risk,
CDS improve credit market liquidity as more investors are willing to
lend in light of the insurance-like protections of CDS.181 Engineered
CDS, however, not only reduce liquidity in the CDS market but also
impair the availability of credit within the markets more generally.
From an ex ante standpoint, engineered CDS transactions
diminish the risk mitigation capabilities of CDS. In the shadow of
engineered transactions, investors are unable to rely on CDS to offset
credit risk exposure and, as a result, they are less likely to extend
credit to companies. Notably, engineered transactions affect credit
availability for all companies that issue bonds or need loans, not
merely past participants in engineered CDS transactions. An investor
will not know prior to her bond purchase whether the company will
participate in an engineered CDS scheme and thus may reduce her
investments generally to limit her exposure. Alternatively, a bond
investor that was willing to purchase bonds of companies with high
credit risk may only purchase investment-grade bonds, recognizing
that financially distressed companies are the most profitable targets
for engineered transactions. Consequently, bond investors will begin
restricting their participation in the credit market ex ante because of
the reduced capability to use CDS for risk mitigation. The resulting
restriction of credit within the markets will increase the cost of capital
for many companies, and for financially distressed companies, it will
compound their already precarious financial condition. In sum, these
say, the Master Agreement allows parties to engage in self-interested conduct, thereby
permitting the type of conduct underlying engineered CDS transactions.
180 See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 26, at 1025 (“Because [CDS] limit the bank’s
downside risk (and pass it on to other parties, such as insurance companies and pension
funds), banks are willing to lend much more money to many more businesses.”).
181 Johnson, supra note 5, at 200 (“Multiple commentators have described credit default
swaps as an instrument that completes credit markets because the instruments allow
market participants to offset exposure to risk of loss.”).
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ex ante effects of engineered transactions are likely to spill into mar-
kets connected to the CDS market, affecting companies and market
participants unrelated to engineered CDS transactions.
*  *  *
From both an ex post and ex ante standpoint, engineered CDS
transactions impose costs on third parties that are not internalized by
the parties to the transactions and, importantly, are not offset by any
gains. Indeed, the far-reaching consequences of engineered CDS
threaten the viability of the CDS markets, increase the cost of capital
for issuers, diminish the utility of CDS as risk mitigation tools, and
decrease the informational value of their prices. In exchange, engi-
neered CDS do not provide any gains to the markets and, as such, the
costs to third parties outweigh the non-existent benefits. The signifi-
cant consequences to third parties strengthen arguments against engi-
neered CDS transactions and likewise against those in favor of
regulatory intervention or private remediation. However, as a market
with sophisticated players, the possibility that the market may be able
to curb costly conduct must be analyzed prior to considering whether
external intervention in the market is needed. Therefore, before
assessing regulatory and private rules applicable to engineered CDS
transactions, Section III.C considers the extent to which market forces
can address and minimize their attendant costs.
C. The Limits of the Market’s Responses
To the extent the market can limit the costs of engineered trans-
actions, external intervention into the market may be unnecessary.
There are two potential market responses that could negate the need
for regulatory involvement to cabin the consequences of engineered
transactions. First, if CDS counterparties can effectively contract
around engineered transactions, then there is little reason for inter-
vention. Second, if market discipline can force CDS traders to inter-
nalize the costs of engineered transactions, there is little cause for
concern or need for regulatory or private remediation. Neither
response, however, is effective in the CDS market.
1. Bilateral Amendments to the Master Agreement
A reasonable market response to engineered transactions would
be for CDS counterparties to bilaterally amend their CDS contracts.
Parties to a CDS contract can modify clauses in the Master
Agreement by including their amendments in the accompanying
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Schedule.182 Thus, a CDS trader could protect herself from engi-
neered transactions by amending the CDS contract accordingly.
Although amending CDS contracts individually is possible, it is rarely
done,183 and, more importantly, it is unlikely market participants will
do so even in the face of engineered transactions. A key factor in the
value and liquidity of a CDS contract is its standardization.184 Stan-
dardized CDS contracts are more easily tradeable because the Master
Agreement’s default terms are familiar to the market and apply uni-
formly.185 A CDS trader may elect to modify what constitutes a credit
event under its CDS contract, but it will face higher transaction costs
in buying (selling) credit protection in the first instance, and once
again when it tries to trade the CDS in the future. Trade-by-trade
amendments to CDS contracts on an individual, haphazard basis
would increase transaction costs and CDS spreads while decreasing
CDS liquidity. Additionally, altering the Master Agreement would
increase contracting costs because the amendments would require
bilateral negotiations pre-trade, and in the event of a credit event,
additional negotiations or judicial intervention could be needed to
interpret the contract. Thus, individually amending CDS contracts is
not an effective market response to engineered transactions.
2. Market Discipline
Per the theory of market discipline, government or regulatory
intervention may not be needed to correct market failures if the
market can prevent or limit negative behavior through market-based
mechanisms.186 Effective market discipline is based on two founda-
182 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing amending the Master
Agreement with Schedules).
183 See Norman Menachem Feder, Market in the Remaking: Over-the-Counter
Derivatives in a New Age, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 309, 342 (2017) (“It could be said that
standardizing OTC derivatives documentation begets a paradox: the more the OTC market
relies upon a form or a standard set of terms, the less apparent room there is to negotiate
bilaterally.”).
184 See Nicholas Vause, Counterparty Risk and Contract Volumes in the Credit Default
Swap Market, BIS Q. REV. 59, 62–63, Dec. 2010, https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/
r_qt1012g.pdf (describing structural changes in the CDS market).
185 See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 78, at 361 (explaining that the liquidity of the CDS
market is linked to the use of standardized contract terms).
186 David Min, Understanding the Failures of Market Discipline, 92 WASH. U. L. REV.
1421, 1428 (2015). Market discipline is commonly associated with regulation of banks and
financial institutions but has broader applicability to how the market, acting through
affected market constituencies, may limit or address misconduct by other actors within the
market through economic and market-based tools. See, e.g., Helen A. Garten, Banking on
the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 129 n.1
(1986); Constantinos Stephanou, Rethinking Market Discipline in Banking: Lessons from
the Financial Crisis 4 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 5227, 2010).
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tional concepts—monitoring and influence.187 First, monitoring refers
to the incentives for and capacity of market actors (i.e., monitors) to
stay abreast of the actions of the “bad actor.”188 Effective monitoring
depends on the ease with which market participants can access infor-
mation about each other’s decisions and actions. In opaque markets,
with high information costs, market actors are less effective in disci-
plining the misconduct of bad actors through market-based means.189
Second, influence refers to the ability of market actors to persuade
bad actors to change their behavior.190 Influence may come directly
from market actors, who may believably threaten punishment or
impose meaningful sanctions on bad actors. In so doing, market actors
would not only penalize the bad actor but would also send a signal to
future bad actors of their fate if they engage in similar conduct.
Market discipline is not an effective restraint on engineered
transactions because of the inherent information asymmetry and high
transaction costs that limit incentives to monitor, on the one hand, and
the muted capacity of market actors to influence counterparties’ con-
duct, on the other hand. To start, CDS market actors lack the neces-
sary information and market transparency to monitor counterparties
that may engage in engineered transactions. CDS counterparties
transact through swap dealers—market intermediaries that trade in
swaps, buying from and selling to investors as requested and
needed.191 A CDS trader is therefore unlikely to know the identity of
her counterparty and cannot serve as an effective monitor.192 And,
even if a CDS trader is able to identify her counterparty, she would
also need to determine whether the counterparty has any relationship
with or interest in the issuer that could serve as the basis for an engi-
neered transaction.
187 Robert R. Bliss, Market Discipline: Players, Processes, and Purposes, in MARKET
DISCIPLINE ACROSS COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIES 37, 39 (Claudio Borio et al. eds., 2004).
188 The phrase “bad actor” is used here to denote the person or entity whose behavior
one seeks to discipline or punish through market forces.
189 Bliss, supra note 187, at 39.
190 Id.
191 See Intermediaries, supra note 50 (discussing the role of swap dealers in the CDS
market).
192 See Final Rules Regarding Further Defining “Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap
Participant” and “Eligible Contract Participant,” U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/
file/msp_ecp_factsheet_final.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2019) (defining swap dealer and the
relationship between swap dealers and swap participants); see also Mila Getmansky, Giulio
Girardi & Craig Lewis, Interconnectedness in the CDS Market, 72 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 62,
73–77 (2016) (providing statistical modeling to show the density of dealers to non-dealers
in CDS contracts).
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Assuming for the sake of the argument that a CDS trader is able
to identify her counterparties, she must then invest further resources
to identify linkages between the issuer underlying the CDS and the
counterparty; additionally, she must continuously stay up to date on
any changes in the counterparty’s investment decisions that may be
related to the issuer. As we consider the extent of these costs, it is
imperative to note that the CDS trader would need to do this level of
research into all her CDS positions involving an issuer that could be a
target for engineering. The scope and associated costs of CDS inves-
tors’ efforts would be significant, and ultimately the benefits—should
any accrue—would be diffused among all CDS investors, regardless of
whether they invested similar resources in monitoring.
It is also questionable whether market actors can influence par-
ties engaged in engineered transactions to adjust or alter their con-
duct. Influence can only work to alter the conduct of the bad actor to
the extent threatened sanctions are believable and punishment fea-
sible. “Naming and shaming” those who engage in engineered CDS
transactions is unlikely to persuade them to change because of the
persistent informational asymmetry in the CDS market. The inability
to identify one’s counterparty, because trades are through an interme-
diary, means that reputational consequences lack teeth. Market disci-
pline, therefore, is rendered ineffective in addressing engineered
transactions because the market lacks the necessary influence to con-
vince parties not to engage in engineered transactions.
In sum, market discipline does not mitigate against the costs that
arise from engineered CDS transactions. The structure of the CDS
market, in which monitoring costs are high and the ability to influence
traders’ conduct is low, renders market discipline impotent in
reducing the negative externalities that accompany engineered trans-
actions. Given the negative externalities of engineered transactions on
third parties and the failure of the market in effectively minimizing
these costs, it is necessary to analyze whether and to what extent the
applicable legal rules and private standards may be effective in lim-
iting the consequences of these transactions. Yet, as is often the case
with financial innovation, engineered transactions are beyond the
scope of the applicable framework, leaving the markets exposed to
significant negative externalities and denying market actors mean-
ingful recourse to redress their harm.
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IV
APPLYING LAW TO ENGINEERED CDS
The costs and consequences associated with engineered CDS pro-
vide a meaningful justification for external intervention to minimize
the externalities of these transactions on third parties. However, as
they have grown in visibility, some have questioned whether and to
what extent the law or private rules can proscribe engineered CDS
transactions. To date, there has been no judicial or regulatory decision
with respect to the legality of engineered transactions, but lawmakers,
market participants, and commentators have varied responses to this
fundamental question. For example, in a public rebuke, the CFTC
stated that manufactured defaults may constitute market manipula-
tion.193 However, the Commissions have not yet brought any enforce-
ment actions for engineered transactions, nor have they explained
how or why these transactions constitute market manipulation under
the existing legal framework. For its part, ISDA has amended its
Determinations Committee procedures to address manufactured
defaults. Owing to the limited scope of ISDA’s amendments, however,
their effectiveness in reducing the costs that accompany engineered
transactions is constrained.
Part IV critically assesses three sources of laws and private rules
applicable to CDS to determine whether they mitigate the costs
arising from engineered CDS transactions. Specifically, Part IV exam-
ines the efficacy of: (i) federal anti-manipulation laws and regulations;
(ii) contract common law; and (iii) ISDA’s rules and procedures in
proscribing or limiting the effects of engineered CDS transactions.
A. Statutory Law: Anti-Manipulation Laws and Regulations
CDS are subject to both the SEC and the CFTC regulatory
regimes.194 Manipulation of the financial markets is prohibited prima-
rily by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)195 and the
Commodities Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA).196 This Section first lays
out the anti-manipulation framework under both regimes and then
193 CFTC Press Release, supra note 12.
194 “The SEC regulates CDS on single names, loans, and narrow-based security indexes.
The CFTC regulates CDS based on broad-based security indexes.” Q & A – Proposed
Rules and Interpretive Guidance Further Defining “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and
“Security-Based Swap Agreement”; Regarding “Mixed Swaps”; and, Governing Books and
Records for “Security-Based Swap Agreements,” U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/
file/pd_qa.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
195 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78(i) (2012).
196 Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 § 6(c), 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2012).
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analyzes the obstacles to classifying engineered CDS as market
manipulation.
1. Anti-Manipulation Framework
a. The SEC and the Exchange Act
Under the Exchange Act, the SEC is empowered to hold market
actors liable for manipulation on the basis of price manipulation or
fraud.197 Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act prohibits transactions
that alter the price of a security or security-based swap to induce
another to buy or sell the security.198 The SEC has not relied exten-
sively on section 9 because of its specific intent requirement, which
has been a heavy burden for the agency to meet.199
The SEC’s preferred, broader anti-manipulation authority is
found in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, which authorizes the SEC
to proscribe “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” in
relation to the purchase or sale of a security or security-based swap.200
Rule 10b-5, enacted based on section 10(b), more specifically pro-
hibits fraud, deception, and material misstatements in the securities
markets.201 In applying section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, courts have
interpreted market manipulation to be a species of fraud202 and as a
result have imported common-law fraud principles into securities anti-
manipulation law.203 To allege a claim under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, the plaintiff must prove: (i) the defendant made a material mis-
statement or omission or used a fraudulent device; (ii) that she did so
with scienter (i.e., intent); (iii) the defendant’s conduct was related to
the purchase or sale of a security; (iv) the plaintiff detrimentally
197 The SEC also may hold market participants liable for manipulation for fictitious
trades in which a trader working alone or in concert with others pretends to trade assets
but with no change in beneficial ownership. Examples of fictitious trades include wash
sales and matched orders. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a)(1). However,
fictitious transactions are not applicable to engineered CDS transactions and, as such, are
not discussed herein.
198 15 U.S.C. § 78i.
199 Fletcher, supra note 170, at 501 (“The requirement that the plaintiff prove both
specific intent and price artificiality is the reason the SEC has avoided pleading price
artificiality to prove manipulation . . . .”).
200 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
201 Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
202 Indeed, Rule 10b-5 equates manipulation with fraud in two out of three of its
provisions. See Charles R. Korsmo, Mismatch: The Misuse of Market Efficiency in Market
Manipulation Class Actions, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1111, 1120–22 (2011) (discussing the
scope of Rule 10b-5).
203 See, e.g., Donald J. Polden, Drawing the Appropriate Statute of Limitations in Implied
Causes of Action Under Rule 10b-5: A General Framework of Familiar Legal Principles, 40
DRAKE L. REV. 221, 248 (1991) (“[I]t appears that the courts have been interpreting Rule
10b-5 in harmony with the elements of state common law fraud actions.”).
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relied; and (v) the plaintiff was harmed.204 Key to a Rule 10b-5 action,
therefore, is a showing of fraud or material misstatement, without
which is it difficult to hold a trader liable for fraud-based market
manipulation.
b. The CFTC and the CEA
The CFTC’s anti-manipulation framework is similar to that of the
SEC’s and includes prohibitions against price manipulation and fraud
in the commodities markets.205 In 2010, the CFTC’s anti-manipulation
authority expanded to include anti-fraud provisions based on section
10(b) of the Exchange Act.206 Section 6(c)(1) of the CEA and the
accompanying Rule 180.1, which mirrors Rule 10b-5, prohibit fraud-
based manipulation in the commodities markets.207 In modeling Rule
180.1 on Rule 10b-5, the CFTC explicitly and implicitly incorporated
Rule 10b-5’s extensive jurisprudence and precedence.208
Prior to this legislative expansion of its authority, price manipula-
tion was the CFTC’s only avenue for holding market actors liable for
market manipulation.209 To allege price manipulation under the CEA,
the plaintiff is required to prove four elements: (i) a manipulative act
or omission; (ii) intent; (iii) causation; and (iv) artificial price.210 Sci-
enter has been an almost insurmountable barrier for the CFTC in
prosecuting manipulation because it must prove that the defendant
204 See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 105 (2d Cir. 2007).
205 Fletcher, supra note 170, at 495–97.
206 7 U.S.C.A. § 9(1) (West 2018). See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted
Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price
Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41398, 41398 (July 14, 2011) (explaining the expanded scope of
the CEA’s regulatory jurisdiction under Dodd-Frank).
207 Prohibition on Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative Deceptive
Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2019).
208 Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41399 (“Given
the similarities between CEA section 6(c)(1) and [SEA] section 10(b), the [CFTC] deems
it appropriate . . . to model final Rule 180.1 on SEC Rule 10b-5. . . . [T]he [CFTC] will be
guided, but not controlled by the substantial body of judicial precedent applying the
comparable language of SEC Rule 10b-5.”).
209 See Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 254 (2015)
(“After decades of the CFTC attempting to win manipulation cases without alleging fraud,
Congress has seemingly ratified the judicial focus on fraud, by including in Dodd-Frank
statutory language granting the CFTC fraud-based manipulative enforcement authority.”).
210 See DiPlacido v. CFTC, 364 F. App’x 657, 661 (2d Cir. 2009); In re LIBOR-Based
Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 27 F. Supp. 3d 447, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); CFTC v. Wilson,
27 F. Supp. 3d 517, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); In re Commodity Exch. Inc., Silver Futures &
Options Trading Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181487, at *45–46 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2012);
CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. Supp. 2d 523, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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had the specific intent to create an artificial price.211 Indeed, the
CFTC won its first non-fraud manipulation case in 2009, approxi-
mately thirty years after its founding.212 Additionally, proving price
artificiality is also difficult because of the difficulty of defining when
or why a price becomes artificial. Consequently, in the absence of
wrongful conduct, courts are unlikely to find that a price is
manipulated.
2. Application to Engineered CDS
There are three primary obstacles that limit the reach of the anti-
manipulation framework to engineered CDS transactions—(i) proving
price artificiality; (ii) the absence of fraud or misrepresentation; and
(iii) proving manipulative intent.
a. Price Artificiality
The first obstacle to proving price manipulation with engineered
CDS transactions is demonstrating that the price is artificial. A price is
considered artificial if it does not represent natural forces of supply
and demand.213 Trading undertaken to create false signals of increased
(or decreased) market interest in an asset generates an artificial price
and, therefore, constitutes illegal market manipulation.214 Setting
aside for the moment the more difficult question of how one deline-
ates between natural and unnatural forces of supply and demand, it is
difficult to see how engineered transactions cause an artificial price
under this legal formulation of artificiality. The resulting (albeit vola-
tile) price of a CDS contract in the wake of an engineered transaction
is set through market forces. As the market learns of an impending
manufactured default, for example, protection sellers rationally and
reasonably will charge more to the extent they remain willing to sell
credit protection. The pricing of the CDS, undoubtedly, has become
211 See Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical Analysis
and a Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 984–88 (1994) (discussing the
difficulty with the predominant view of intent).
212 DiPlacido is the first manipulation case that the CFTC has prosecuted successfully in
its history. This does not include settlements for manipulation over the decades. See
DiPlacido, 364 F. App’x at 659 (affirming the decision of the CFTC to apply sanctions for
manipulation); see also Fletcher, supra note 170, at 501 n.85; Andrew Longstreth, Analysis:
CFTC Faces High Hurdles in Oil Manipulation Case, REUTERS (May 26, 2011), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-arcada-cftc-lawsuit/analysis-cftc-faces-high-hurdles-in-oil-
manipulation-case-idUSTRE74P6GF20110526.
213 See Ronald W. Anderson, Credit Default Swaps: What Are the Social Benefits and
Costs?, 14 FIN. STABILITY REV. 4–5 (2010) (discussing the use of CDS to leverage
transactions).
214 See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in
Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 507 (1991) (defining market manipulation).





      10/28/2019   11:39:54
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-5\NYU502.txt unknown Seq: 53 28-OCT-19 10:54
November 2019] ENGINEERED CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 1125
inefficient, as the spread no longer reflects the financial condition of
the reference entity; but, notably, the price is the result of legitimate
market transactions in response to non-deceptive disclosures of an
impending default. This may seem to be a fine hair to split, but it is a
distinction worth making. Thus, although the CDS spread post-
engineering is untethered from the financial condition of the issuer, it
is the market-driven price and, therefore, not artificial under the
existing legal framework.
An argument could be made that because engineered transac-
tions distort the informational value of CDS spreads as a reflection of
the creditworthiness and risk of default of the issuer, they manipulate
the price of the CDS. However, this would require a redefinition of
“artificial” which courts may not be willing to do, particularly within
the confines of a contract between sophisticated, well-informed par-
ties.215 Indeed, while engineered transactions cause CDS spreads to
no longer provide the markets with accurate information on the finan-
cial condition of the issuer or its true likelihood of default, this inaccu-
racy is not the result of what existing law considers to be false market
signals. Rather, the inaccuracy of the spread arises because engi-
neered transactions divorce financial condition from default and not
because of unnatural market forces. Thus, despite distorting the price
discovery mechanism of the markets, engineered CDS do not result in
price manipulation under the current conceptualization of artificiality
in anti-manipulation law.
b. Fraud and Material Misstatements
A second obstacle to holding a trader liable for market manipula-
tion is the absence of fraud or misstatements in engineered CDS
transactions. Engineered CDS transactions do not involve fraud or
deception either by the CDS investor proposing the transaction nor by
the issuer. Rather, depending on the significance of the financing,
issuers may be required to release a Form 8-K to inform the markets
of the proposed financing, identifying the lenders and, if applicable,
any conditions attached to the transaction. For example, Hovnanian
disclosed all the material terms of its financing transaction with GSO
in its Form 8-K, including the condition that it miss its upcoming
interest payment in order to receive the loan.216 Providing a loan to a
distressed company does not fit the standard definition of fraud or
215 See, e.g., CFTC v. Wilson, No. 13 Civ. 7884, 2018 WL 6322024 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30,
2018) (rejecting CFTC’s claim of market manipulation on the basis that the defendant’s
conduct was contractually permissible, among other reasons).
216 Hovnanian Enterprises, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 26, 2018), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/357294/000143774918010943/hov20180529_8k.htm.
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misrepresentation in anti-manipulation law. Likewise, although manu-
factured defaults and orphan CDS transactions may seem unfair, they
are contractually permitted and, legally, do not constitute fraud or
misrepresentation. Thus, a primary avenue for proving market manip-
ulation is not available in holding CDS counterparties liable for engi-
neered transactions.
c. Manipulative Intent
Third, underlying both price and fraud-based manipulation claims
is the requirement of scienter. Scienter is a necessary element to hold
a trader liable for market manipulation, and it is questionable whether
regulators would be able to meet their burden.217 Recall that to prove
price artificiality, regulators must demonstrate that the plaintiff had
the specific intent to create an artificial price. Historically, this has
been a difficult burden for regulators to meet, and it is unlikely to be
any easier with engineered CDS transactions. To succeed on this ele-
ment, plaintiffs must demonstrate defendants’ intentional or willful
efforts to deceive others.218 However, if regulators lack a “smoking
gun” as unequivocal proof of the manipulative intent of the engi-
neered CDS traders, such as explicit statements of the intent to
manipulate the markets, proving specific intent in these transactions
will be nearly impossible.219
Alternatively, regulators may attempt to hold engineered CDS
investors liable through the general anti-fraud manipulation provi-
sions on the basis that these transactions constitute open-market
manipulation. Open-market manipulation is market manipulation
accomplished through facially legitimate transactions executed on the
open market.220 The Commissions’ long-held position is that open-
market trades constitute market manipulation if the trader had the
intent to manipulate the market.221 Thus, engineered CDS transac-
tions could qualify as open-market manipulation, if the Commissions
are able to prove the intent to manipulate. The evidentiary bar in this
instance is lower—the Commissions would only be required to prove
217 See Pirrong, supra note 211, at 984–88 (discussing the difficulty with the
predominant view of intent).
218 ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 100 (2d Cir. 2007).
219 Fletcher, supra note 170, at 515–16 (“Rarely is direct evidence of a defendant’s
manipulative intent available. . . . Absent explicit or direct proof of a trader’s intent to
manipulate, plaintiffs and fact finders must infer intent from circumstantial evidence.”).
220 Id. at 516.
221 Id. at 502.
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the general intent to manipulate222—but it would nonetheless be a dif-
ficult burden to meet.223
Specifically, with facially legitimate transactions, the accused may
rebut allegations of manipulation by showing legitimate, business-
related motivations for the transaction.224 Counterparties that engage
in engineered CDS transactions can assert a non-manipulative busi-
ness purpose for the transactions, unrelated to market manipulation.
With a legitimate, economically rational explanation, it is unlikely that
a regulator’s circumstantial allegations of manipulative intent will suf-
fice. Indeed, the CFTC recently suffered a significant loss in its prose-
cution of open-market manipulation in CFTC v. Wilson.225 The CFTC
alleged that the defendant, Don R. Wilson and his trading firm (col-
lectively, DRW) exploited the terms of an interest rate swap contract
for their benefit, manipulating the market in the process. The defen-
dant, however, presented a legitimate business explanation for their
conduct, denying that they were manipulating the market with their
transactions. Faced with the defendant’s economically rational expla-
nation for their conduct on the one hand, and the CFTC’s circumstan-
tial evidence of manipulative intent on the other hand, the court
unequivocally rejected the Commissions’ claims, stating that “it is not
illegal to be smarter than your counterparties in a swap
transaction.”226
In sum, given recent court decisions on the issue of manipulative
intent for open-market transactions, it is unlikely that the
Commissions would be able to meet their evidentiary burden to prove
market manipulation for engineered CDS transactions. The existing
anti-manipulation framework is ill-suited to proscribe and punish
engineered CDS transactions because the underlying conduct is per-
missible and proving the intent to manipulate would be a Herculean
task for the Commissions. Thus, despite the proclamations of the
Commissions on the matter, it is doubtful that CDS counterparties
participating in engineered CDS transactions could be held liable for
market manipulation.
222 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018) (codifying the prohibitions of fraud-based
manipulations); see also Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg,
Stock Market Manipulation and Its Regulation, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 67, 117 n.117 (2018);
Fletcher, supra note 170, at 540.
223 See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text.
224 See SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
225 CFTC v. Wilson, No. 13 Civ. 7884, 2018 WL 6322024 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018).
226 Id. at *21.





      10/28/2019   11:39:54
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-5\NYU502.txt unknown Seq: 56 28-OCT-19 10:54
1128 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1073
B. Contract Common Law
As contracts, CDS are subject to contract common law if parties
disagree as to the validity and interpretation of its terms. In inter-
preting a contract, courts rely on canons of contract interpretation,
even for standardized contracts like the ISDA Master Agreement.227
Under the principles of contract interpretation, a court first attempts
to identify the intent of the parties at the time of contracting from the
language of the contract.228 If the parties’ intent is unclear, the court
considers the course of the parties’ dealings and performance to ascer-
tain their intent.229 The court may also examine industry custom and
practice to decipher the expectations of the parties.230 Importantly, in
interpreting parties’ obligations, courts apply the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing to ensure that parties do not avoid their
expected duties under the contract. The implied covenant assumes
that neither party will act in such a way that will destroy or injure the
right of the counterparty to receive the benefit of the contract.231
However, to determine whether the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing has been breached, the court also examines the language of
the contract, the course of dealings of the parties, and the perform-
ance of the contract.232
Initially, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
appears to circumscribe CDS counterparties’ engagement in engi-
neered CDS transactions. By negotiating with the issuer to guarantee
a preferred outcome, the counterparty is interfering with the contract
in order to deny her counterparty’s right to benefit from the CDS.
However, the ISDA Master Agreement includes a provision which
must be taken into account in assessing the applicability of good faith
and fair dealing. Under the Master Agreement, each party is expressly
allowed to transact without regard for the CDS, and, importantly,
each is allowed to engage in transactions involving the underlying ref-
erenced asset, including “any action which might constitute or give
rise to a Credit Event”233 (the “Self-Interest Provision”). That is to
say, the ISDA Master Agreement explicitly permits CDS counterpar-
ties to enter into transactions related to or directly involving the debt
227 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 76, at 1141.
228 Keith A. Rowley, Contract Construction and Interpretation: From the “Four Corners”
to Parol Evidence (and Everything in Between), 69 MISS. L.J. 73, 79–80 (1999).
229 See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 787 (1999).
230 Id. at 812.
231 See, e.g., Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 98 (2d
Cir. 2007).
232 23 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:22 (4th ed. 2019).
233 ISDA Credit Definitions Section 11.1(b)(iii) (2014).
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underlying the CDS, without regard for the existence of the CDS or
the interests of the CDS counterparty. In light of the Self-Interest
Provision, it is questionable whether engineering one’s preferred out-
come in a CDS transaction breaches the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the ISDA Master Agreement.
In a recent case, the New York state appellate court addressed
the implications of the implied covenant of good faith on a CDS
counterparty’s self-dealing conduct under the Master Agreement
given the Self-Interest Provision.234 In Good Hill Master Fund L.P. v.
Deutsche Bank AG, Good Hill and Deutsche Bank entered into a
CDS agreement that referenced a series of residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) that Good Hill purchased from Bank of
America. Under the CDS agreement, Good Hill was the protection
seller and was obligated to compensate Deutsche if the underlying
experienced a write-down or forgiveness of the principal.235 To secure
its obligation, Good Hill posted collateral with Deutsche Bank to
ensure payment should a credit event occur. A year later, owing to
declining market conditions, Bank of America sought to repurchase
the RMBS from Good Hill, which would be a credit event under the
Good Hill–Deutsche CDS agreement.236 To decrease its liability
under the CDS agreement, Good Hill negotiated price and payment
allocation with Bank of America on the repurchase of the RMBS.
Based on the negotiated repurchase price of the RMBS, Good Hill
owed Deutsche five million dollars under the calculations specified in
the CDS agreement; Deutsche at the time held twenty-seven million
dollars in collateral from Good Hill.237 However, Deutsche refused to
accept the negotiated repurchase price and payment allocation and
refused to return the excess collateral to Good Hill.238
In the ensuing lawsuit, Good Hill sued for return of its collateral
and a breach of contract. Deutsche Bank defended its actions, alleging
that Good Hill breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing under the CDS contract by “engineer[ing] [a] commercially
unreasonable and untenable . . . purchase price” for the RMBS.239 The
appellate court, however, disagreed with Deutsche Bank, affirming
the decision of the trial court. According to the court, Good Hill’s
234 Good Hill Master Fund L.P. v. Deutsche Bank AG, 146 A.D.3d 632 (N.Y. App. Div.
2017).
235 Id. at 633.
236 Id. at 634.
237 Id. at 635.
238 Id. at 636.
239 Good Hill Master Fund L.P. v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 600858/2010, 2016 WL
3580032, at *15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 2016).
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negotiations with Bank of America were at arm’s length, and, despite
being aggressive, the negotiations were done in good faith.240 Further,
the court noted, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
does not impose any obligations beyond the terms of the contract and
it cannot impose duties that would contradict other terms of the con-
tract.241 In light of the Self-Interest Provision, Good Hill was per-
mitted to both (i) enter into transactions involving the RMBS
underlying the CDS, and (ii) pursue its own interests even if its actions
may be detrimental to Deutsche Bank’s interests.242 In concluding, the
court stated that Deutsche Bank failed to meet its burden of proving
Good Hill acted in bad faith in breach of the CDS contract.
In light of the Self-Interest Provision and the Good Hill holding,
it is not likely that engineered CDS transactions would be considered
a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The collabora-
tion between a CDS counterparty and the issuer is typically an arm’s
length transaction in which the CDS counterparty is negotiating a
financing transaction and, as consideration, the issuer agrees to certain
conditions that impact the CDS. Furthermore, the Self-Interest
Provision explicitly allows parties to act in their own self-interest
without regard for the CDS contract. In the absence of bad faith con-
duct on the part of the CDS counterparty in undertaking the engi-
neered CDS transaction, it is unlikely that the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is breached. The gain of one CDS counterparty at the
expense of the other does not constitute a breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing without additional bad faith actions.
Indeed, a party to a contract is entitled to act in her own self-interest
provided that her conduct is consistent with the terms and conditions
of the contract.243 In a nutshell, this describes the conduct of CDS
counterparties who participate in engineered transactions—they are
acting in their own self-interest and in accordance with the terms of
the CDS contract; thus, they are unlikely to be in violation of the cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing.
240 Good Hill Master Fund L.P. v. Deutsche Bank AG, 146 A.D.3d 632 (N.Y. App. Div.
2017).
241 Good Hill, 2016 WL 3580032, at *16.
242 Id. at *16–17.
243 See Citibank N.A. v. United Subcontractors, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646 (S.D.N.Y.
2008), aff’d, 355 F. App’x 507 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating in relation to the duty of good faith
and fair dealing that “[a] party to a contract is allowed to act in its own self-interest
consistent with its rights under the contract”).
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C. Private Law: ISDA’s Rules and Governance
ISDA’s role in the CDS markets makes it the natural problem-
solving entity for engineered CDS. Despite being fiercely protective
of the Master Agreement in some instances,244 ISDA’s response to
engineered CDS has been lukewarm, at best. It made no changes to
the Master Agreement in response to Codere, nor did it express disap-
proval of the transaction; rather, the association was silent in the face
of early iterations of engineered CDS. It was only after negative press
reports on and significant market backlash to the Hovnanian transac-
tion that ISDA spoke out against engineered transactions.245 Slowly,
more than a year after the Hovnanian–GSO transaction was dis-
carded, ISDA proposed amendments to the Master Agreement to
address engineered CDS transactions, but in a limited manner.
In August 2019, ISDA finalized and published amendments to the
2014 Credit Derivatives Definitions to limit the availability of engi-
neered CDS transactions, specifically, manufactured defaults (the
“Amended Definition”).246 As with all ISDA amendments, market
participants’ adherence to the new provision is entirely voluntary and
such adherence is effectuated through signing the related protocol.247
When first proposing the Amended Definition, ISDA noted that it
would be exceedingly difficult for it to draft a comprehensive defini-
tion of what constitutes a manufactured default that would not be sub-
ject to the risk of being undermined by parties in the future.248 Thus,
the Amended Definition addresses manufactured defaults by focusing
on its most salient characteristic: namely, the decoupling of the
issuer’s creditworthiness or financial condition from its likelihood of
default on its debt obligations.249
244 Choi & Gulati, supra note 76, at 1144–46 (2006) (discussing ISDA’s swift
intervention into the CDS markets when the ISDA Master Agreement is threatened with
misinterpretation).
245 See Press Release, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, supra note 15 (“We believe that
narrowly tailored defaults, those that are designed to result in CDS payments that do not
reflect the creditworthiness of the underlying corporate borrower . . . could negatively
impact the efficiency, reliability and fairness of the overall CDS market.”).
246 INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2019 NARROWLY TAILORED CREDIT EVENT
SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2014 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS (2019), https://
www.isda.org/a/KDqME/Final-NTCE-Supplement.pdf (referring to manufactured defaults
as “narrowly tailored credit events”).
247 INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA 2019 NTCE PROTOCOL (2019), https://
www.isda.org/a/31AME/08272019-NTCE-Protocol-Publication.pdf.
248 INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 2014 ISDA
CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS RELATING TO NARROWLY TAILORED CREDIT EVENTS
(2019), https://www.isda.org/a/CKeME/20190320-NTCE-consultation-doc-complete.pdf.
249 Id.
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With the Amended Definition, ISDA circumscribes manufac-
tured defaults by expanding what constitutes “Failure to Pay” under
the Master Agreement. Specifically, an issuer’s default on outstanding
debts does not constitute a Failure to Pay if “such failure does not
directly or indirectly either result from or result in a deterioration in
the creditworthiness or financial condition” of the issuer.250 Under the
“Credit Deterioration Requirement,” there must be a causal link
between the issuer’s default and its declining creditworthiness or eco-
nomic condition.251 Notably, the Determinations Committee would be
responsible for deciding whether a default is a contractually valid
Failure to Pay. In making its determination, the Determinations
Committee would be allowed, but not required, to consider external
information that may assist it in making its decision. Additionally, the
Amended Definition lists a non-exhaustive set of factors that may
indicate that the Credit Deterioration Requirement has not been met,
including: (i) the default resulted from an arrangement with the issuer
for the purpose of benefitting a counterparty to a CDS; (ii) the default
is quickly cured after the grace period; or (iii) the issuer has sufficient
liquidity to meet its debt obligations, among other reasons.252
The Amended Definition is a positive, first step towards
addressing engineered CDS transactions, specifically manufactured
defaults. By requiring a causal link between the issuer’s failure to pay
and a deterioration of its creditworthiness or its financial condition,
the Amended Definition restores the connection between the issuer’s
risk of default and its credit risk that CDS are expected to reflect.
Thus, the Amended Definition would assist in reestablishing the infor-
mational value of CDS spreads to the market and disincentivize
counterparties from engaging in manufactured defaults. Rather than
trying to account for all possible future iterations of manufactured
defaults, the Amended Definition opts for a non-exhaustive list of fac-
tors that the Determinations Committee can consider, injecting sub-
jectivity into the decisionmaking process.253 Thus, the Determinations
Committee is empowered to investigate the underlying transaction,
which may violate the spirit of the CDS contract, rather than solely
interpreting the letter of the contract.
250 INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2019 NARROWLY TAILORED CREDIT EVENT
SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2014 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS § 2 (2019), https://
www.isda.org/a/KDqME/Final-NTCE-Supplement.pdf.
251 Id. § 3 ¶ 1.4.
252 Id. § 3 ¶ 1.10.
253 INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, supra note 246, at § 3 ¶ 1.9 (noting that factors
set out for the Credit Deterioration Requirement are “not exhaustive”).
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By authorizing the Determinations Committee to determine
whether a default constitutes a valid, contractually recognizable
Failure to Pay, the Amended Definition notably veers away from
ISDA’s traditionally textualist approach to the Master Agreement.254
The Amended Definition permits the Determinations Committee to
consider the underlying purpose of the transaction that resulted in the
issuer’s default in deciding whether there is a contractually obligated
credit event.255 Notably, ISDA has introduced greater ambiguity into
the Master Agreement with the possibility of a Determinations
Committee investigation to identify contractually acceptable instances
of default, rather than strict interpretation of the contract’s terms. It
must be noted that the inexactitude of the Amended Definition is a
strength, not a weakness. The strategies that CDS counterparties use
today to engineer CDS transactions may not be the strategies that
they use tomorrow or next year. The subjectivity inherent in the
Amended Definition provisions, therefore, provides the
Determinations Committee with needed leeway to address future iter-
ations of manufactured defaults that fundamentally divorce credit risk
from default risk.
Despite these positive attributes, ISDA’s amendments are incom-
plete and do not provide a comprehensive response to engineered
transactions. The Amended Definition provides a mechanism by
which manufactured defaults are invalidated, but it fails to do the
same with respect to transactions aimed at avoiding or negating CDS
default. While it may be arguable that manufactured defaults are the
most egregious of the three forms of engineered transactions, it is
undeniable that the other forms of engineered CDS transaction are
likewise costly to the markets. In failing to address the means by
which counterparties can avoid and negate defaults, the Amended
Definition creates an opportunity for regulatory arbitrage in the CDS
market.256 It is likely, therefore, that parties interested in guaranteeing
the outcome of their CDS positions will employ strategies that are
treated differently under the Amended Definition but economically
have the same result. Thus, while the Amended Definition diminishes
254 See supra Section I.C.
255 INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, supra note 246, at § 3 ¶¶ 1.9–1.11.
256 Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 230 (2010) (defining
regulatory arbitrage as the “manipulation of the structure of a deal to take advantage of a
gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its regulatory treatment”);
Hossein Nabilou, Regulatory Arbitrage and Hedge Fund Regulation, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 557, 563 (2017) (“[R]egulatory arbitrage, broadly defined, refers to shifting
activities from a heavily regulated financial sector to an unregulated or lightly regulated
financial sector with the aim of maximizing profits by taking advantage of regulatory
differentials.”).
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the incentives to manufacture CDS defaults, it simultaneously
heightens the attractiveness of transactions aimed at avoiding and
negating defaults for protection sellers.
Even with regards to manufactured defaults, the Amended
Definition has shortcomings. The Determinations Committee is
empowered to decide whether a Failure to Pay constitutes a valid
credit event, but it is not required to consider external factors. In
granting the option to the Determinations Committee to elect
whether or not to consider outside factors, the Amended Definition
weakens the efficacy of its proscription. In light of ISDA’s historically
textualist approach to the Master Agreement, allowing the
Determinations Committee to make that choice may result in a con-
tinued formalistic approach in recognizing whether a credit event has
occurred, especially for more ambiguous cases. Along the same vein,
while it is laudable that the Amended Definition’s list of factors that
may indicate that a default is engineered is non-exhaustive, it is
important that the Determinations Committee take a capacious view
of its authority to invalidate manufactured defaults. Undoubtedly, the
effectiveness of the Determinations Committee in proscribing manu-
factured defaults hinges in large measure not only on its ability to rec-
ognize evolutions in the form of these transactions but, importantly,
on its willingness to identify as impermissible those transactions that
are not explicitly listed.
The Amended Definition is a meaningful starting place for ISDA
to address engineered transactions, but its limited scope restricts the
efficacy of its prohibitions. In focusing exclusively on manufactured
defaults, the Amended Definition leaves the other two strategies
available to counterparties who want to engineer their CDS’ out-
comes, thereby heightening the possibility of arbitrage. Thus, owing to
its narrow focus, it is questionable how effective the Amended
Definition can be in limiting the net negative costs associated with
engineered CDS transactions in the market.
V
PATHWAYS FORWARD: ADDRESSING THE GAP
The existing gap in the law applicable to CDS in providing a com-
prehensive response to engineered CDS transactions threatens the
viability of the CDS market. To minimize the far-reaching conse-
quences of engineered CDS transactions, it is necessary to consider
how to address the ills attendant to engineered CDS without
destroying the benefits of CDS on which the market relies. Part V
recommends three proposals aimed at limiting the pernicious effects
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of engineered CDS transactions. Broadly, the Article’s proposals
include broadening the scope of ISDA’s amendments, implementing
contractual changes to the Master Agreement, and reconceptualizing
a key element of market anti-manipulation laws. Each is detailed
below.
A. Broadening the Scope of ISDA’s Amendments
The Amended Definition provides a valuable template for how
we ought to consider implementing changes to address engineered
transactions. To most effectively limit the availability of engineered
transactions, contractual amendments ought to be open-ended and,
ultimately, grant a decisionmaker flexibility to identify ever-evolving
engineering strategies. In this regard, the Amended Definition relies
on the Determinations Committee to assess the contractual validity of
a default by examining whether it undermines the essential purpose of
CDS, even if it complies with the letter of the Master Agreement. Yet
to be more impactful, the Amended Definition must be expanded.
Specifically, the form and process by which engineered transactions
are invalidated needs to be more robust and not only limited to manu-
factured defaults.
To meaningfully expand the Amended Definition requires careful
consideration of whether the Determinations Committee, as currently
comprised, is best suited to identify and address engineered transac-
tions. Although it seems reasonable to empower the Determinations
Committee to investigate engineered transactions, there are legitimate
concerns that arise from relying on the Determinations Committee.
Traditionally, the Determinations Committee has taken a textual and
formalistic approach to its interpretation of the Master Agreement,
and it will continue to do so for all clauses except the Amended
Definition. This creates a dichotomy regarding how the
Determinations Committee will fulfill its mandate and may result in
the Committee doing neither job particularly well going forward. One
option to address the Determinations Committee’s bifurcated mission
could be to expand its authority, such that it has broader investigatory
and interpretative authority over the Master Agreement. This option
could improve the Determinations Committee’s overall operation;
however, such an expansion would subsume the Determinations
Committee, transforming it into an entirely different body. Another
option could be to form a separate decisionmaking body with a
broader mandate to complement the Determinations Committee. This
Article supports the latter route and proposes that ISDA form a sepa-
rate “Adjudicatory Committee” authorized to assess whether transac-
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tions or counterparty conduct violates the spirit, even if not the letter
of the Master Agreement.
The Adjudicatory Committee would have responsibility for ex
ante and ex post interpretive questions regarding the Master
Agreement and its application among CDS counterparties. It would
provide market participants with a mechanism by which to challenge
the validity of engineered transactions within ISDA’s framework. For
example, it would consider whether the last-minute loan to
RadioShack ought to be treated as a default (as parties had argued in
their petition to the Determinations Committee) given the conflict of
interest of the lender.257 Notably, the Adjudicatory Committee would
be required to investigate and make a decision on questions it receives
regarding ex ante interpretation or ex post application of the Master
Agreement. From an ex ante standpoint, the Adjudicatory Committee
would be empowered to answer interpretive questions regarding the
scope, applicability, or interpretation of the Master Agreement. Ex
post, it would evaluate whether an event constitutes a contractually
valid credit event, an effort to avoid an issuer’s default, or negates
future default under the Master Agreement.
In making ex post decisions, the Adjudicatory Committee’s role
would overlap with that of the Determinations Committee because it
would be deciding whether a credit event occurred based on contex-
tual analysis of the transaction and other extraneous evidence. How-
ever, the proposed Adjudicatory Committee and the Determinations
Committee would be able to coexist with little issue under the
Article’s proposal for two reasons. First, the Determinations
Committee would remain the initial decisionmaker as to whether a
credit event has occurred. Second, the Adjudicatory Committee
would only intervene if (i) the Determinations Committee decided
that additional considerations ought to be taken into account in
making its decision, or (ii) a CDS counterparty alleged that a transac-
tion was improperly engineered. Thus, the Adjudicatory Committee
would complement the work of the Determinations Committee and
would not be superfluous or redundant within ISDA’s current
framework.
Further, the Adjudicatory Committee’s role as the official inter-
preter of the Master Agreement would also serve to eliminate poten-
tial sources of ambiguity before they are exploited or wreak havoc in
the CDS markets. More broadly, the Adjudicatory Committee would
provide the CDS market with the internal structure to interpret and
enforce the Master Agreement. Currently, this is lacking in the CDS
257 See supra Section II.B.





      10/28/2019   11:39:54
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-5\NYU502.txt unknown Seq: 65 28-OCT-19 10:54
November 2019] ENGINEERED CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 1137
market and would only be introduced on a limited basis through the
Amended Definition—not nearly widescale enough to meaningfully
address engineered transactions and similarly exploited loopholes in
the Master Agreement. By establishing an internal adjudicatory and
interpretive body, ISDA would have a more streamlined mechanism
through which it can assert its preferred interpretation of the Master
Agreement, particularly if a court later hears the dispute. Formation
of the Adjudicatory Committee would allow ISDA, as the standard
setter and drafter of the Master Agreement, to be the definitive voice
with respect to the interpretation and enforcement of the Master
Agreement’s terms and clauses. If market participants know that they
can petition the Adjudicatory Committee for an official interpretation
of what a clause means or what it permits, this would increase predict-
ability and certainty in the market. Further, a potential indirect conse-
quence of the Adjudicatory Committee would be less regulatory
scrutiny of the industry and its trading strategies. In proactively
embracing an enforcement mechanism to review and possibly reject
engineered transactions, ISDA would be providing regulators with
some assurances that it was addressing these problematic transactions,
thereby staving off regulatory interference in the market.
Creating an Adjudicatory Committee would expand the capacity
of the CDS market to respond to engineered transactions—whether
they are in forms currently known or in iterations yet unknown.
Moving away from a formal, textual approach to the Master
Agreement is necessary to accommodate the evolution and develop-
ment of the CDS market. The Adjudicatory Committee would expand
on the Amended Definition by granting greater flexibility to the deci-
sionmaker to examine transactions to verify whether they conform
with both the spirit of the Master Agreement and the purpose of the
CDS contract. Further, the Adjudicatory Committee would enable
ISDA to protect the market’s integrity in the face of potentially
exploitative transactions that undermine the essential purpose of CDS
as financial instruments.
Although implementation of an Adjudicatory Committee would
provide a direct path to respond to engineered CDS transactions, it is
not without potential shortcomings. One issue with the Adjudicatory
Committee is that it may add ambiguity and complexity to the CDS
market. While it is true that the Adjudicatory Committee would rely
on a contextual analysis to decide whether a credit event has occurred,
it is not true that a contextual analysis is more unpredictable than a
formalistic textual analysis, especially when the latter results in eco-
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nomically unsound conclusions.258 Further, the Adjudicatory
Committee’s purview would be limited to complex cases involving
allegations of engineered transactions or contractual ambiguity, not to
all considerations of whether there is a credit event. Thus, concerns
that the Adjudicatory Committee would needlessly complicate the
markets are overstated.
The establishment of an Adjudicatory Committee would raise
noteworthy concerns about the power and authority of ISDA in the
CDS markets, particularly given that it is subject to little to no regula-
tory oversight or public accountability. Adding the Adjudicatory
Committee to ISDA’s framework could increase the trade associa-
tion’s dominance over the CDS market and, by extension, market
actors that are powerful within ISDA. A significant concern with
adding to the ISDA governance framework is that it would be cap-
tured by politically powerful actors within the markets, thereby dimin-
ishing its utility as a bulwark against engineered transactions. Owing
to political realities within ISDA, it is possible that the Adjudicatory
Committee would not be effective in reducing engineered transac-
tions; and that, instead, it would serve the interests of the most pow-
erful in these disputes. However, given the preferences of CDS
market participants to avoid government intervention, it is just as
likely that the Adjudicatory Committee would try to be more-or-less
even-handed in its decisionmaking to obviate regulatory scrutiny.
B. (Re)Establishing Good Faith Obligations
To date, courts have not interpreted whether the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing prohibits engineered transactions
specifically. However, in light of the court’s holding in Good Hill and
similar cases involving the applicability of the covenant of good faith
in the Master Agreement, there is a strong likelihood that courts may
not view the implied covenant as proscribing engineered transactions.
This Article proposes imposing disclosure obligations on swap dealers,
which will indirectly establish good faith obligations, despite the Self-
Interest Provision and provide an indirect way to limit the feasibility
of engineered CDS.
As the primary intermediaries in the CDS markets, it is likely
that a CDS counterparty that engages in engineered CDS transacted
with a swap dealer—either the CDS counterparty bought or sold CDS
from a swap dealer or a swap dealer intermediated the transaction
between the CDS counterparty and another party. It may be possible
to indirectly regulate engineered CDS through requirements that are
258 See supra Section I.C.
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imposed on swap dealers that affect their CDS transactions with
counterparties. There are two possible avenues through which this
may be accomplished.
First, in executing CDS transactions, swap dealers must obtain
representations and warranties from their counterparties and ensure
that the transactions comply with the respective Commission’s regula-
tions. Notably, since these representations and warranties were the
result of the Dodd-Frank Act and were not contemplated in the ISDA
Master Agreement, ISDA published DF (Dodd-Frank) Protocols 1.0
and 2.0 to facilitate compliance with new CFTC regulations.259 To reg-
ulate engineered CDS, the Commissions could require swap dealers to
include a prohibition against these types of transactions among their
representations and warranties. By including a prohibition against
engineered transactions within the representations and warranties, the
Commissions could indirectly limit the availability of these transac-
tions to CDS traders. Further, to the extent a counterparty breaches
the covenant, she could be subject to enforcement actions from the
Commissions for failing to comply with the regulations, and she could
also face a private cause of action for breach of contract.
Second, under the Commissions’ business conduct rules, swap
dealers are required to disclose any “material incentives or conflicts of
interest” that they have with respect to the transaction to their non-
swap dealer counterparties.260 Further, they are required to communi-
cate with counterparties fairly and in keeping with the principles of
fair dealing and good faith.261 These provisions are intended to protect
swap dealers’ counterparties, particularly non-dealers such as pension
funds or municipalities, but could be expanded to reach the conduct of
all CDS counterparties that transact with swap dealers. In order to
accomplish this, the requirement to disclose material incentives and
conflicts of interest should flow equally between both parties and not
merely from swap dealers to non-dealer counterparties. To prevent
the disclosure obligation from being too onerous, it would be limited
to material incentives or conflicts that may affect or trigger the CDS
payout. The disclosure obligation would also accompany future trades
of the CDS such that the information is available to later counterpar-
ties. By requiring disclosure of plans to engage in an engineered CDS
transaction, traders are able to reject counterparties that have indi-
cated their intentions to intervene in the market. Alternatively, it
allows CDS traders to decide if they want to charge or demand a
259  INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA MARCH 2013 DF PROTOCOL
AGREEMENT (2013), http://assets.isda.org/media/38756a02/7ecb18ba-pdf.
260 17 C.F.R. § 23.431(a)(3) (2018).
261 Id. § 23.433.
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higher price from the counterparty to offset the risk of loss. Disclo-
sure, therefore, minimizes informational asymmetry between the
counterparties, which would increase the cost of engineered transac-
tions and in turn lower their profitability and their occurrence. Addi-
tionally, this disclosure requirement may also enhance market
discipline, enabling CDS traders to avoid counterparties that might
engage in engineered transactions or have done so in the past.
By imposing either or both of these contractual provisions on
swap dealers, the regulators would be able to cabin the availability of
engineered transactions to the market. A contractual proscription on
engineered transactions or a disclosure obligation with respect to con-
flicts of interests would introduce an additional contractual clause into
the CDS transaction that would have to be balanced against the Self-
Interest Provision. Thus, the ability of CDS counterparties to act in a
self-interested manner would have as the outer limit their obligations
to refrain from engineering outcomes and to disclose relevant con-
flicts. This would establish the applicability of good faith and fair
dealing as a meaningful restriction on strategic behavior that under-
mines the value and purpose of CDS to the market. Relatedly, this
proposal would increase the costs of engineered CDS for their propo-
nents because it would increase the difficulty of finding counterparties
with whom to trade and increase the probability of successful lawsuits
challenging the transaction.
Despite these positive attributes, this proposal has shortcomings
that limit its effectiveness. Specifically, this would be an indirect way
to address engineered transactions. It places the burden on swap
dealers, who are unlikely to engage in engineered CDS, rather than on
CDS counterparties directly.262 Indirect regulation oftentimes is
accompanied by unconsidered collateral consequences within the mar-
kets. Such unexpected effects often manifest after it is too late and
sometimes in ways that may have made the cure worse than the orig-
inal disease. For instance, the disclosure requirement this Article pro-
poses could be utilized by market participants to engage in strike suits,
to attempt to gain access to information that is beyond the scope of
262 There are a few reasons why swap dealers are unlikely to engage in engineered
transactions. First, participating in these transactions would harm their reputational capital
and as identifiable counterparties in the market, CDS traders would refuse to transact with
a swap dealer knowing that it has a reputation for engineering. Therefore, any profits
earned from engaging in an engineered transaction would be eroded through a loss of CDS
business. Second, for regulatory reasons, as market makers swap dealers are required to
maintain as neutral a position as possible in order to not run afoul of the Volcker Rule. 12
U.S.C. § 1851 (2012); Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain
Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg.
5536 (Jan. 31, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 255).
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what is considered here, or some other improper reason. Indirect reg-
ulation of the contractual terms of the CDS, therefore, could morph
into a host of other issues that leave the market worse off than before.
For this reason, whenever possible it is preferable to regulate directly
rather than indirectly. Yet, this proposal would increase transparency
in a notoriously opaque market. It would also better allow counterpar-
ties to enforce their contractual rights, either to disclosure or good
faith conduct, thereby dissuading potential CDS engineers from
undertaking the transaction.
C. Redefining Artificiality
The Article’s final proposal to respond to engineered transactions
rests in expanding how price artificiality is defined under the anti-
manipulation laws. This is the broadest of the Article’s three pro-
posals and aims to modernize how the legal framework addresses
modern trading strategies that distort the markets through per se
legitimate conduct. The price artificiality standard is one of the orig-
inal anti-manipulation provisions under both the securities and com-
modities regulatory regime. The proscription was adopted in the
1930s, and while the markets have evolved in ways that could not have
been predicted, the price manipulation prohibition has not exper-
ienced similar expansion. As the law has failed to keep pace with the
markets, legal gaps exist for conduct that has the same impact as tradi-
tional market manipulation schemes but utilizes modern-day trading
strategies.
Although the author believes that Congress and the Commissions
should modernize several other aspects of the market manipulation
framework, the Article focuses narrowly on expanding the price artifi-
ciality standard in proposing changes to the anti-manipulation frame-
work because of its direct applicability to engineered transactions.
Engineered transactions decrease the price efficiency of the markets
by distorting the informational value of the CDS spread. While there
is harm to the market and the prices are less accurate, under existing
anti-manipulation laws, this does not constitute market manipulation.
Thus, the price artificiality standard should be expanded to consider
how a transaction impacts the information being reflected in the price,
even if the transaction is per se permissible, as is the case with engi-
neered transactions.
Traditionally, in deciding whether a price is artificial, courts rely
on one of two approaches. A court may consider a price to be artificial
if it either (i) does not reflect legitimate forces of supply and
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demand;263 or (ii) deviates from its historical or expected value.264
Implicit in both formulations is the assumption that the price is artifi-
cial because of illicit conduct that interferes with supply and demand
or that results in deviation from what is expected. And, in the absence
of illicit conduct, transactions constitute price manipulation only if the
trader had manipulative intent when transacting.265 As I have argued
in other scholarship, the legitimacy of a transaction ought not to shield
it from being considered as potentially artificial.266 Indeed, per se
legitimate conduct can distort the information reflected in the price of
the asset, sending inaccurate and artificial signals to the market. Thus,
if we take seriously the proposition that permissible conduct can
create price artificiality because it distorts market pricing, then it can
be argued that engineered transactions result in price artificiality. But,
to make this argument, we must expand the legal conception of what
it means for a price to be artificial, particularly with respect to per se
legitimate conduct.
This Article contends that engineered transactions create an arti-
ficial price because they interfere with the legitimate market forces
that ought to establish the CDS spread. Consider that the market’s
response to news of an engineered CDS is expected, but this does not
make it a legitimate force within the market. An engineered transac-
tion is designed to alter the payout of the CDS contract and guarantee
the profitability of one trader’s positions. As such, the intervention of
a CDS counterparty to engineer the outcome of the CDS is an
improper and illegitimate market force that results in an artificial
price. The permissibility of the engineered transaction from a contrac-
tual standpoint should not be confused with its legitimacy as an influ-
ence on the price of the CDS. In the absence of the engineered CDS,
the value of the instrument would be determined by the vicissitudes of
the referenced asset; however, because of the engineered CDS, the
price is made artificial. The engineered transaction impedes the
market’s ability to assess the default risk of the issuer based on its
financial condition. Thus, practically and realistically, the price is arti-
ficial because it is set through illegitimate, even if permissible, market
considerations.
263 See Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense,
56 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 370 (1987) (“Another approach defines artificial price as a price
that does not reflect the ‘basic’ or ‘legitimate’ forces of supply and demand.”).
264 Id. at 367 (“[A]n artificial price is one that is historically unusual, either because of
its absolute level or because of its relationship to other prices.”).
265 See supra Section IV.A (discussing the law regarding open-market manipulation).
266 Fletcher, supra note 170, at 517.
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Additionally, engineered transactions cause CDS prices to
deviate from their historical and expected value because they distort
the information reflected in CDS spreads. Post-engineering, the CDS
spread reflects the likelihood of success of the engineered transaction,
rather than default risk connected to financial condition. The CDS
spread historically does not reflect this information nor is it the
default risk that the market expects to be reflected in the transaction.
Yet, once an engineered transaction has been announced, the CDS
spread reflects the probability of the negotiated outcome between the
issuer and the CDS counterparty, not the risk of default associated
with the issuer’s financial condition. Again, the contractual accepta-
bility of the engineered transaction does not render the resulting price
true. Rather, engineered transactions result in CDS prices sending dis-
torted signals to the markets regarding the issuer’s risk of default,
given that default risk is no longer connected to financial condition.
Redefining price artificiality in this way would provide the
Commissions with an effective tool to respond to engineered CDS and
punish those who participate in these transactions. Importantly, this
Article’s proposal to expand the conception of price artificiality would
not require legislative change; rather, it would require the
Commissions to alter their theory of liability for price artificiality.
Regulators have, in the past, changed their analysis and application of
laws and regulations in response to market changes and develop-
ments. For example, in the realm of insider trading, the SEC extended
its theory of insider trading to recognize liability if the trader “misap-
propriated” information and traded on this information in violation of
a fiduciary duty owed to the source.267 This extension of the insider
trading was novel and had not been part of the historical bases of
liability for insider trading. But, importantly, it was not beyond the
scope of the agency’s legislative authority to prosecute insider trading.
The misappropriation theory of insider trading did not contradict
prior law or statutory authority; it merely extended the application of
the law to other scenarios using a new theory.
Similarly, altering the theory of liability for price artificiality
would not be beyond the Commissions’ authority. However, given
that it would be a change to how the Commissions apply previously
existing standards, the Commissions are likely to face significant resis-
tance from the courts in their new standards. With decades of prece-
dent defining what constitutes an artificial price, altering the theory of
liability is likely to be difficult without legislative support. Thus, legis-
lative changes would provide the Commissions with an acceptable
267 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 648–49 (1997).
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explanation for their redefinition of price artificiality when being chal-
lenged in court. However, changes that would depend on an act of
Congress and that would increase liability for the market are not
likely to be well-supported or feasible at this juncture. In sum,
expanding the definition of artificiality would address engineered
transactions directly and modernize the anti-manipulation framework,
but the lack of political will makes this path an unlikely one at this
time.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding their negative reputation, CDS are useful finan-
cial products that enhance pricing efficiency, increase market liquidity,
and increase the availability of credit to companies. With CDS, inves-
tors are able to offset their risk exposure and companies can more
easily gain access to capital. To fulfill these laudable benefits, CDS
ought to reflect an issuer’s risk of default due to its financial condition.
Engineered transactions, however, remove the risk of default as one
counterparty unilaterally decides when and if a company defaults to
guarantee its CDS positions’ profitability. Default no longer becomes
an uncertain risk but is guaranteed to occur (or not) based on the
counterparty’s CDS positions. When CDS traders are allowed to
bypass market forces to guarantee profits on a transaction, the mar-
kets suffer—pricing becomes inefficient and liquidity is negatively
impacted. Further, engineered transactions impose costs on market
actors unaffiliated with the CDS market and undermine the public’s
trust in the financial markets. Engineered CDS transactions, there-
fore, are detrimental to the markets, imposing negative externalities
on the markets that outweigh their limited benefits.
The existing public and private frameworks applicable to CDS,
however, are ill-suited to effectively address engineered transactions.
As financial instruments based on a privately crafted boilerplate con-
tract, CDS are subject to anti-manipulation laws and regulations and
contract common law, neither of which limit the availability of engi-
neered transactions. ISDA has amended the Master Agreement in
response to engineered transactions, but owing to the narrowness of
the amendments, they do not effectively combat engineered transac-
tions. Thus, engineered transactions continue to impose significant
negative externalities on third parties, undermining the utility and via-
bility of the CDS markets.
As the markets continue to innovate in ways that may distort and
disrupt the efficiency of the markets, it is incumbent on the law to
keep pace with constantly evolving yet distortive practices, like engi-
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neered transactions, that escape the reach of existing approaches. To
this end, this Article proposes a range of legal responses, each aimed
at responding to engineered transactions and safeguarding the future
of the CDS markets. By taking a forward-looking approach to the
CDS markets, this Article recommends flexible, capacious solutions to
engineered transactions designed to address current and future itera-
tions of these schemes. This Article proposes three potential legal
responses to minimize the availability of engineered transactions,
which range in terms of both difficulty of implementation and com-
prehensiveness. Fundamentally, however, this Article challenges
lawmakers and regulators to recognize the need for modernization of
the market manipulation framework, which remains crucial to mini-
mizing the impact of innovative distortions on the markets going
forward.
